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Chapter 1 

INTRODUCTION 

Governments and businesses in a number of commercial arenas today recognize 
information as their most valuable asset.  They are all storing information in 
electronic form which gives them a number of advantages over previous physical 
storage.  However, with the electronic revolution, information faces new and po­
tentially more damaging security threats.  Unlike information printed on paper, 
information in electronic form  can potentially be stolen from  a  remote loca­
tion. It is much easier to intercept and alter electronic communication than its 
paper-based predecessors.  The fundamental goal of cryptography is to protect 
users from such attacks.  This objective is  being met by public and private-key 
cryptosystems which require implementations of cryptographic functions.  More 
specifically, these include encryption, decryption, authentication, digital signa­
ture algorithms and message-digest functions.  The security of such functions is 
based on the computational complexity of an underlying mathematical problem 
(believed  to be hard to solve),  such  as factoring large numbers or computing 
discrete logarithms. 
In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller introduced the use of elliptic curves 
in cryptography  with  a  new  mathematical hard problem:  the elliptic  curve 
discrete logarithm.  This problem is believed to be extremely hard, much harder 
than the analogous ones defined before.  Due to the high difficulty of computing 
the discrete  logarithm problem  in elliptic  curves  over  finite  fields,  the same 
security provided by other cryptosystems can be achieved with smaller fields, 
hence shorter key  lengths.  The benefit of such particularity is well appreciated 
when memory and processing power is limited, such as in smart cards and other 
small devices. 2 
High performance implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems depend 
heavily  on  the efficiency  of the arithmetic operations needed  for  the elliptic 
curve operations.  This fact leads us to focus our efforts on the field operations 
(multiplications and squarings, etc.)  of such cryptosystems. 
In this thesis, we concentrate on improving algorithms for number theoretic 
cryptosystems.  Our work is mainly focused on implementing elliptic curve cryp­
tosystems efficiently, which require space and time-efficient implementations of 
arithmetic operations over finite fields. 
We  introduce new prime numbers and methods for  fast  arithmetic opera­
tions over finite fields.  We choose to work on special primes of the form 2k+2i+l 
(k, i E N, k > i), mainly because the Montgomery multiplication and exponen­
tiation can be significantly accelerated. 
Since the efficiency  of elliptic curve cryptosystems inherently depends on 
the efficiency of multiplication, the main issue is then to manage multiplication 
efficiently,  which is  usually followed  by a  reduction.  Therefore,  in this thesis, 
we  mainly focused on multiplication algorithms. 
Chapter  2  section  2.1  through  section  2.3  provides  general  information 
about security services and different types of cryptosystems including public­
key and private-key cryptosystems.  Common cryptographic terminology is also 
introduced in these sections. 
Chapter 2 section 2.4 and section 2.5 explore different mathematically hard 
problems on which public-key cryptosystems are based. Strong and weak points 
of the systems are also presented in order to compare the level of security they 
provide.  Then the elliptic curve logarithm problem is compared to the discrete 
logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem. 
Chapter 2 section 2.6 includes the definitions related to the elliptic curves. 
It mainly describes how  a  set of points on an elliptic curve form  an Abelian 
group, and how to manage the group operations on this set.  It also explains the 
addition operation formula for  elliptic curves and provides an introduction to 3 
arithmetic operations in finite fields.  Finally the elliptic curve digital signature 
algorithm scheme is discussed. 
Chapter 2 section 3.1 through section 3.3 give the background necessary to 
understand the motivation and the contents of the contributions made, which 
are presented in Chapters 3 section 3.4 through 3.10.  Results of some previous 
implementations are also summarized. 
In Chapter 3 section 3.5  through section 3.9,  we  present a set of five  op­
timized algorithms that are  used in elliptic curve cryptosystems.  New  meth­
ods for performing modular reduction using special primes are described.  This 
method can be used to obtain fast software implementations of the finite field 
multiplication and squaring operations. 
In Chapter 3 section 3.10, we  show the impact of our new optimized algo­
rithms on the the elliptic curve digital signature. 
Chapter 4 concludes the thesis with the summary of the results, contribu­
tions and discussions. 
In Appendix A and  B,  we provide a list of low-weight special primes of the 
form 2k + 2i + 1 and 2k + 2i - 1 for 64:Sk:S511, 64:Si:Sk-l. 4 
Chapter 2 

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS 

2.1  Information Security 
Information security describes all measures taken to prevent unauthorized use 
of electronic data - whether this unauthorized use takes the form of disclosure, 
alteration, substitution, or destruction of the data concerned.  Information se­
curity can be classified as the provision of the following three services: 
•  Confidentiality - concealment of data from unauthorized parties. 
•  Integrity - assurance that data is genuine. 
•  Availability - the system still functions efficiently after security provi­
sions are in place (services are not denied). 
Cryptographic systems are used to offer the services listed above.  Broadly 
speaking, a cryptographic system transforms electronic data to a modified form. 
Depending on the security services required, the assurance may be that the data 
cannot be altered without detection, or it may be that the data is unintelligible 
to all but authorized parties.  Cryptographic systems are controlled by the use of 
a key to determine the transformation performed.  The key itself also takes the 
form of an electronic string. The owner of the cryptographic key must continue 
to ensure the security of the information by guarding the key itself. 
In order to clarify and demonstrate how cryptographic systems (  cryptosys­
tems) are employed, confidentiality and integrity are further sub-classified into 
five  services that can be thought of as the building blocks of a secure system: 5 
• 	Confidentiality - concealment of data from unauthorized parties. 
• 	User Authentication-assurance that the parties involved in a real-time 
transaction are who they say they are. 
• 	Data Origin Authentication- assurance of the source of a message. 
• 	Data Integrity - assurance  that the data has  not  been  modified  by 
unauthorized parties. 
• 	Non-repudiation - the binding of an entity to a transaction in which 
it participates, so  that the transaction cannot later be repudiated.  That 
is,  the receiver of a transaction is  able to demonstrate to a neutral third 
party that the claimed sender did indeed send the transaction. 
Different security services use different types of cryptographic systems.  In 
the next section, we will describe how public-key and private-key cryptosystems 
are used to provide these security services. 
2.2  Types of Cryptographic Systems 
Preparing a  message for  a secure,  private transfer involves  the process of en­
cryption.  Encryption transforms data in user or machine readable form, called 
the plaintext, to an illegible version,  called the ciphertext.  The conversion of 
plaintext to ciphertext is controlled by an electronic key k.  The key is simply a 
binary string which determines the effect of the encryption function.  The reverse 
process of transforming the ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption, 
and is controlled by a related key i. 
There  are  two  broad classes  of cryptosystems,  known  as  symmetric-key 
cryptosystems and public-key cryptosystems.  The relationship between k and 
i differentiates the two. 6 
2.2.1  Symmetric Key Cryptosystems 
In a symmetric-key cryptosystem, the same key is used for both encryption and 
decryption.  Since the keys  are the same, two users wishing to communicate in 
confidence must agree and maintain a common secret key.  They can do this by 
physically meeting, but this can be impractical or sometimes even impossible, 
or they might use the services of a trusted courier. 
Let M  denote the set  of all  possible plaintext messages,  C the set of all 
possible ciphertext messages and }( the set of all possible keys. 
A private key cryptosystem consists of a family of pairs of functions 
and  Dk  : C --+ M  k E }(  , 
such that 
for all  m  E M  and k E  JC 
The main disadvantages of the private key cryptosystems are: 
1. 	Key distribution problem (a secure channel may not be available) 
2. 	 Key management problem (if the number of pairs is large then the number 
of keys becomes unmanageable) 
3. 	 No signatures possible 

Some common examples of symmetric-key systems include: 

• 	DES  [18] 
•  IDEA  [18] 
• 	RC5 [18] 7 
2.2.2  Public Key Cryptosystems 
In public-key cryptosystems (introduced as recently as 1976 by Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin Hellman,  the abilities to perform encryption and decryption are 
separated.  The encryption rule employs a public-key e (that is k=e), while the 
decryption rule requires a different  (but mathematically related) private-key d 
(that is  i=d).  Knowledge of the public-key allows encryption of plaintext but 
does not allow decryption of the ciphertext. And in terms of an arbitrary group 
it can be described as: 
1. 	 (Setup) A and B  publicly select a  (multiplicatively written) finite group 
G and an element a E G. 
2. 	 A generates a random integer a,  computes aa  in G, and transmits aa to 
B  over a public communications channel. 
3. 	 B  generates a random integer b,  computes ab  in G, and transmits ab  to 
A over a public communications channel. 
4. 	 A receives ab  and computes (  ab)a. 
5. 	B  receives aa and computes (aa)b. 
A and B now share the common group element aab.  Note that an eavesdropper 
knows G,a,aa and ab, and his task is to use this information to reconstruct aab. 
This problem is commonly referred to as Diffie-Hellman problem.  The problem 
of computing a,  given  G,  a  and aa  is  called the  discrete  logarithm problem. 
Some common examples of public-key systems include: 
• 	ECC [6,  12] 
• 	ElGamal [3] 
• 	RSA [16] 8 
2.3  Security Services using Public-Key Cryptosystems 
Public-key cryptosystems are capable of fulfilling all of the main objectives of 
information security.  This section outlines how  each  of these services can be 
provided.  For illustrative purposes, each service is discussed in the context of a 
hypothetical communication between two users,  Alice and Bob.  Bob's private 
key will be denoted by ebob  and his public key by  dbob· 
2.3.1  Public-Key Encryption- Confidentiality 
Suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message to Bob.  During system set-up, 
Bob makes ebob, his public key,  available to all users by publishing it in a public 
directory, the electronic equivalent of a phone book.  To communicate message 
M  to Bob, Alice first looks up ebob in the public directory.  Alice then encrypts 
M  by  performing the public-key transformation using  Eebob'  to transform M 
into ciphertext C.  This process is denoted by: 
Finally Alice sends C  to Bob.  Bob retrieves M  by transforming C using Ddbob 
by computing: 
2.3.2  Digital Signatures- Data Integrity, Non-repudiation 
Digital signatures are the equivalent of traditional handwritten signatures. Elec­
tronic signatures cannot be formed by simply appending a fixed string to ames­
sage since this would make it easily forgeable.  To avoid compromise in this way, 
digital signatures are performed in a more complex manner using a public-key 
cryptosystem.  The essential difference  between the use  of a  public-key cryp­
tosystem for  signing and its use for  encrypting is that the order in which the 
keys  are used  is  reversed.  In data encryption first  Alice  applied  Eebob  to M, 9 
then Bob decrypted using Ddbob'  In digital signatures, first Bob applies Edbob  to 
compute his signature, then Alice checks, or verifies, the signature using Debob' 
Suppose now that Bob wishes to sign a message M.  Bob first transforms 
M  using a  hash function.  The output of the hash function  is  a  value which 
is  specific to the content of the message itself.  This output, denoted h(M), is 
called a message digest and can be thought of as a "fingerprint" of the message. 
Bob signs M  by transforming h(M) using Edbob  to obtain: 
Bob now sends M  and S to Alice as his signature on M. IfAlice wants to verify 
Bob's signature on M, she first retrieves ebob·  Then she recomputes the message 
digest, h(M), from Musing the publicly available hash function.  Finally, Alice 
transforms S using  Debob  and compares the result with h(M).  If Alice  finds 
that: 
then she accepts Bob's signature as valid.  Otherwise Alice concludes that S  is 
not Bob's signature for that message M  which has been modified. 
This signature process provides the services of data origin authentication, 
data integrity, and non-repudiation since changing M  would changeS, and Bob 
is the only one who can transform the message to obtain S. 
2.4  Hard Mathematical Problem 
All cryptographic systems rely on the difficulty of a mathematical problem for 
their security.  A  mathematical problem is  said  to be difficult  if the fastest 
algorithm to solve the problem takes a long time relative to the input size.  An 
algorithm runs quickly relative to the size of its input if it is a polynomial time 
algorithm, and slowly if it is an exponential time algorithm. 
Thus, when looking for a mathematical problem on which to base a public­
key cryptographic system, cryptographers are searching for a problem for which 10 
the fastest algorithm takes exponential time. Today, only three types of systems 
should be considered both secure and efficient.  The systems, classified according 
to the mathematical problem on which they are based, are: 
•  Integer Factorization System (RSA) 
•  Discrete Logarithm Systems (DSA) 
•  Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Systems (ECC) 
In the following  sections,  we  will  describe the underlying problems these 
systems are based on. 
2.4.1  Integer Factorization Problem 
The first cryptographic system, called RSA, relies on the difficulty of the Integer 
Factorization Problem.  The problem is defined as follow: 
Given an integer n,  which  is  the product of two  large primes,  determine 
these factors, i.e., find primes p and q such that p.q = n  (e.g.,3.5 = 15). 
An RSA public-key consists of a pair (n, e),  where e is a number between 
1 and n - 1,  and n  is  the product of two large primes.  To provide short term 
security n should be at least 500  bits.  RSA can be used for  both encryption 
and digital signatures  by  performing modular arithmetic.  Modular  addition 
and  modular  multiplication modulo  n  works  just like  ordinary addition  and 
multiplication, except that the answer is  reduced to its remainder on division 
by n  (e.g., 3.5 =  1 (mod 7)). 
Modular arithmetic plays a central role in the implementation of all three 
types of public-key cryptosystems. When RSA is used as an encryption scheme 
or as a digital signature scheme, exponentiation modulo n must be performed. 
Suppose m, a  number between 0 and n- 1,  represents a  message.  Then the 
modular exponentiation, me  (mod n),  must be calculated for  some number e 
(private-key)  when m  is  tranformed.  This modular exponentiation dominates 
the time required to perform RSA. 11 
2.4.2  Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Another mathematical problem defined in terms of modular arithmetic is  the 
discrete logarithm problem modulo a prime p.  Fix a number p,  then given an 
integer g between 0 and p - 1 we  have the following relation between g and y: 
y =  gx  (mod p) 
for some x. The discrete logarithm problem modulo pis to determine the integer 
x for a given pair g and y. 
Like  the integer factorization problem, no efficient  algorithm is  known to 
solve the discrete logarithm problem modulo p. 
2.4.3  Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
In 1985, Neil Koblitz [6]  and Victor Miller [12] independently proposed the Ellip­
tic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), whose security rests on the discrete logarithm 
problem over the points on an elliptic curve.  ECC can be used to provide both 
a digital signature scheme and encryption scheme. 
An elliptic curve, defined modulo a prime p, is the set of solutions (x, y)  to 
an equation of the form: 
2 y =  x 
3 + ax + b (mod p) 
for  two numbers a and b.  If (x, y)  satisfies the equation then P  =  (x, y)  is  a 
point on the elliptic curve.  Addition of two points can be defined on the curve. 
Suppose P  and Q are both points on the curve, then 
P+Q 
will always be another point on the curve.  And the elliptic curve discrete loga­
rithm problem can be defined as follows: 
Given two points P  and Q on the curve such that Q equals x.P (Q =  x.P), 
for some x, determine x  (where the value x.P represents the point Padded to 
itself x times). 12 
As for  the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm prob­
lem modulo p, no fast (polynomial time) algorithm is known to solve the elliptic 
curve discrete logarithm problem.  The existing algorithms require fully expo­
nential time. 
2.5  Comparison of Public-Key Cryptosystems 
When examining the theoretical security of a public-key cryptosystem, breaking 
the system requires solving the underlying mathematical problem.  The question 
we  are trying to answer in this section is  the following:  Which is,  of the three, 
the hardest problem? The integer factorization problem, the discrete logarithm 
problem modulo p, or the elliptic curve discrete logartihm problem. 
As  a  concrete example, Table 2.1  and 2.2  [1]  compares the time required 
to break ECC with the time required to break RSA or DSA for  various mod­
ulus size.  The values are computed in MIPS years  (a MIPS year represents a 
computing time of one year on  a  machine capable of performing one  million 
instructions per second). 
Table 2.1. Computing power required to compute elliptic curve logarithm 
I Field size (bits)  I MIPS years 
163  9.6. 1011 
191  7.9. 1015 
239  1.6. 1023 
359  1.5 •  1041 
431  1.0. 1052 
To  achieve  reasonable security,  RSA  and DSA  should employ a  1024-bit 
modulus,  while a  160-bit modulus should be sufficient  for  ECC. The security 
gap between the systems grows as the key size increases (300-bit ECC is a great 
deal more secure than 2000-bit RSA). 13 
Table 2.2. Computing power required to factor integers 
Size of n  (bits)  J  MIPS years 
512  3 * 104 
768  2 * 108 
1024  3. 1011 
1536  3. 1016 
2048  3 * 1020 
Table 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 show the efficiency of the different systems in terms of 
key size (bits required to store key pairs and system parameters) and bandwith 
(bits that must be communicated to transfer encrypted message) in bits. 
Table 2.3. Size of system parameters and key pair 
System parameters  Public-Key  Private Key 
RSA  n/a  1088  2048 
DSA  2208  1024  160 
ECC  481  161  160 
It is  clear from  Table 2.3  that the system parameters and key  pairs are 
shorter for ECC than for  either RSA or DSA 
Table 2.4. Signature size for 2000-bit messages 
I  Signature size 
RSA  1024 
DSA  320 
ECC  320 
From Table  2.4  and  2.5,  we  can conclude  that ECC offers  considerable 
bandwith savings over the other types of public-key cryptographic systems when 
being used to transform short messages. 14 
Table 2.5. Encrypted message size for  100-bit messages 
I  Encrypted message size 
RSA  1024 
DSA  2048 
ECC  321 
2.6  Elliptic Curves and Cryptography 
2.6.1  Mathematical Background 
We  begin by introducing some basic mathematical terminology.  A group is  an 
abstract mathematical object consisting of a set G together with an operation 
*defined on pairs of elements of G.  The operation has the following properties: 
•  closure - a * b E G for all a, b E G 
•  associativity- a* (b *c) =  (a* b)* c for all a, b, c E G 
•  existence of identity - 3 e  E  G such that e * a = a * e = a for all a E G 
•  existence of inverse- V a  E G 3 bEG such that a*b =  b* a= e,  b =  a-1 
A group G  is  said to be abelian if V a, b E  G, a* b =  b *a.  The order of 
a group is the number of elements in G.  For example, the integers modulo n, 
namely Zn  =  0, 1, 2, ... , n- 1,  forms a group of order n  under the operation of 
addition modulo n.  The additive identity of this group is  0.  If  p  is  a  prime 
number, then the non-zero elements of Zp,  namely Zp*  =  1, 2, ....,p- 1,  forms 
a  group of order p - 1 under the operation of multiplication modulo p.  The 
multiplicative identity of this group is 1.  The order of a group element g E G is 
the least positive integer n such that gn  (modp) =  1.  For example, in the group 
Z11 *,  the element g =  3 has order 5. 15 
2.6.2  Background in Elliptic Curve 
We  now  give  a  brief introduction to the theory of elliptic curves.  For more 
details, consult [6,  12].  In this thesis, we  restrict our discussion to the elliptic 
curves over  Zp.  An elliptic curve  E  over  Zp  is  defined  by  an equation of the 
form 
(2.1) 
where  a, b E  Zp,  and 4a3 + 27b2  '¢  0  (mod p),  together with a  special point 
0, called the point at infinity.  The set E(Zp) consists of all points (x, y), x  E 
Zp, y E  Zp,  which satisfies the defining equation 2.1, together with 0. 
An addition operation of two points on an elliptic curve E(Zp) can be de­
fined to give a third elliptic curve point. Together with this addition operation, 
the sets of points E(Zp) forms  a  group with 0  serving as identity.  It is  this 
group that is used in elliptic curve cryptosystems.  The identity 0  is such that 
P+O=O+P=P, 
for all P  E E(Zp)· If  P = (x, y)  E E(Zp), then (x, y) + (x, -y) = 0. The point 
(x, -y) is denoted -P, and is called the negative of P; observe that-Pis indeed 
a point on the curve.  Let P = (x1, y1)  E E(Zp) and Q = (x2 , y2)  E E(Zp), where 
P # -Q. Then P + Q =  (x3, y3), where 
and 
where 
ifP#Q, 
if P= Q 
Observe that the addition of two elliptic curve points E(Zp) requires a few 
arithmetic operations (addition, substraction, multiplication, and inversion)  in 
the underlying finite field  Zp. 16 
For historical reasons, the group operation for  an elliptic curve E(Zp) has 
been called addition.  By contrast, the group operation in Zp* is multiplication. 
Table 2.6 shows the correspondence between notation used for  the two groups 
Z/ and E(Zp)· 
Table 2.6. Correspondence between Z/ and E(Zp) 
Group  E(Zp) 
Group elements  integers 1, 2, ... , p- 1  Points (x, y) on E  plus 0 
Group operation  multiplication modulo p  addition of points 
Notation  Elements:  g, h  Elements:  P,Q 
Multiplication:  g * h  Addition:  P + Q 
Inverse: g­1  Negative: -P 
Division: gfh  Substraction: P-Q 
Exponentiation:  ga  Multiple: aP 
DLP  Given g  E  Zp.  Given P  E  E(Zp) 
and h  =  ga mod p, find a  and Q  = aP, find a 
2.6.3  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is composed of three 
steps: 
•  key generation 
•  signature generation 
•  signature verification 
These three procedures are described in the following sections. 
2.6.4  ECDSA Key Generation 
Each entity does the following: 
•  Select an elliptic curve E(Zp) with #E(Zp) divisible by a large prime n. 17 
•  Select a point P  E E(Zp) of order n 
•  Select an unpredictable integer din (1, n- 1]. 
• 	Compute Q =  d.P 
• 	Public key is  (E, P, n, Q); private key is  d. 
2.6.5  ECDSA signature Generation 
To sign a message m, Bob does the following: 
•  Select an unpredictable k in (1, n - 1]. 
• 	Compute k.P =  (xi, yr)  and r =XI mod n  (if r =  0 go to step 1). 
• 	Compute k-I mod n. 
• 	Computes= k-I(h(m) + d.r) mod n, where his the Secure Hash Algo­
rithm (SHA-1) 
• 	If s =  0 go to step 1. 
• 	The signature for the message m is the pair of integers (r, s). 
2.6.6  ECDSA signature Verification 
To verify a signature (r, s), an entity does the following: 
• 	Obtain an authentic copy of Bob's public key  (E, P, n, Q). 
•  Verify that r and s are in the interval (1, n- 1]. 
• 	Compute w =  s-I (mod n) and h(m) 
• 	Compute ui =  h(m).w (mod n) and u2  =  r.w (mod n) 
• 	Compute uiP + u2Q =  (xo, y0)  and v =  x0  (mod n) 
• 	Accept the signature if and only if v =  r. 18 
Chapter 3 

IMPROVING MONTGOMERY ALGORITHMS 

3.1  Introduction 
The arithmetic operations in  Galois field  GF(p)  have  several  applications in 
cryptography.  Examples of cryptographic applications are elliptic curve cryp­
tosystems  (Koblitz  1994),  over  the field  GF(p),  and the Diffie-Hellman  key 
exchange algorithm based on the discrete exponentiation (Diffie  and Hellman 
1976).  Both applications require the implementation of modular multiplication 
which can be written efficiently using the Mongtomery method [13]. 
In order to achieve improved performance, several different methods have 
been proposed [9].  However the proposed algorithms are not taking advantage 
of the binary structure of the field  modulus. 
In this thesis,  we  optimize  the five  different  Montgomery  multiplication 
algorithms  (SOS,  CIOS,  FIOS,  FIPS, and CIHS)  studied in  [9]  using special 
primes of the form  2k + 2i + 1 (k, i  E  N, k  > i).  We  have performed a thor­
ough analysis of the optimized versions of different Montgomery methods and 
compared them to the original methods.  We show that the new algorithms are 
significantly faster.  Some timing results of the algorithms together with digital 
signature (ECDSA) timings are given in Section 3.10. 
3.2  Previous Work 
The introduction of the Montgomery multiplication  [13]  has been one of the 
most interesting and useful  advances in  modular arithmetic.  This method is 
used to compute fast multiplication by replacing division by a modulus n with 
division by a power of 2. 19 
Several versions of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm were proposed 
[9]  in an attempt to modify the original method in order to obtain more efficient 
software implementations.  These algorithms differ  on the way  multiplication 
and reduction are combined. 
Some  special classes  of elliptic  curves  defined  over  GF(p),  where  p is  a 
special prime, also allow efficient implementations.  A reduction algorithm, for 
modulus of the special form  m  =  bt ± c  (where  m  is  a  t-digit base b positive 
integer and can l-digit base b positive integer), is given in [11]. 
In [4],  a technique for  accelerating arithmetic, based on a modulus of the 
form e2a ± 1 is  presented (e2a  within a single word).  This method is  suitable 
for both hardware and software implementations. 
Generalized Mersenne primes are another type of special modulus (2kn.W ± 
2kn-l·w ± ... ±1, where kn  > kn-l > ...)which can be exploited for fast reduction. 
In this case,  the residue can be expressed as  a sum or difference  (mod m)  of 
small number of terms [17]. 
From  the software  implementation  point  of view  of elliptic  curves  over 
GF(p), no papers have discussed methods for improving the Montgomery mul­
tiplication using special fields.  Montgomery multiplication is used with random 
curves over arbitrary prime fields.  However, the formula given for implementing 
the field  multiplication is not taking advantage of the modulus pattern. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  In Section 3, we present 
a  short introduction to Montgomery multiplication in GF(p).  The proposed 
algorithms are described and analyzed in sections 4 thru 9.  Some running times 
of the improved algorithms are presented in Section 10.  The overall impact on 
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature is also given. 
3.3  Montgomery Multiplication 
Here,  we  present a brief introduction to Montgomery multiplication; more in­
formation on Montgomery multiplication can be found in [13,  8,  9]. 20 
The Montgomery multiplication is an efficient way for computing the mod­
ular product of two integers x andy as follows: 
z =  x.y (mod n),  (3.2) 
where x,  y  and n are k-bit binary numbers, i.e.,  2k-l ::;  x, y, n < 2k.  The al­
gorithm is  used  to speed up modular multiplications and squarrings required 
during the modular exponentiation process. It is particularly suitable for imple­
mentation on general-purpose computers (signal processors or microprocessors) 
which  are  capable of performing fast  arithmetic modulo a  power  of 2.  The 
Montgomery algorithm produces the resulting k-bit number z in (3.2) without 
performing a division by the modulus n.  The Montgomery algorithm computes 
MontMult(x, y) =  x.y.r-
1  (mod n)  (3.3) 
given x, y < n  and r  such that gcd(r, n) =  1.  The algorithm works for  any r 
which is relatively prime to n.  However,  some additional efficiency is obtained 
when r  is  taken to be a  power  of 2  (r  is  chosen  to be 2k).  If n  is  odd,  the 
requirement gcd( n, r) =  1 is satisfied. 
To summarize the basic idea behind the Montgomery multiplication algo­
rithm, we  first define the n-residue of an integer x < n as 
x =  x.r (mod n).  (3.4) 
It is straightforward to show that the set 
{ x.  r  (mod n)  0 ::;  x ::;  n - 1 }  (3.5) J 
is  a complete residue system, i.e., it contains all numbers between 0 and n-1. 

Thus there is  one-to-one correspondence between the numbers in the range 0 

and n-1  and the numbers in the above set. 

The Montgomery multiplication algorithm exploits this property by introduc­

ing a  much faster multiplication routine which computes the n-residue of the 
21 
product of two integers whose n-residue is given.  Given two n-residue x and fj, 
the Montgomery product is defined as then-residue 
z =  x.fj.r-
1  (mod n),  (3.6) 
where r-1  is the inverse of r modulo n, i.e., it is the number with the property 
r-
1 .r =  1 (mod n). 
The resulting number z in (3.6)  is indeed then-residue of the product 
z =  x.y (mod n), 
since 
z 	 x.fj.r-
1  (mod n) 
x.r.y.r.r-
1  (mod n) 
x.y.r (mod n). 
An additional quantity n' is needed to describe the Montgomery multipli­
cation algorithm. It is the integer with the property 
r.r-1 - n.n' =  1 . 
The integers n' and r  can both be computed by the Extended Euclidean algo­
rithm [5].  The computation of the Montgomery product is given as follows: 
function MontMult(x, y) 
Step 1.  t := x.fj 
Step 2.  u := (t + (t.n' mod r).n)/r 
Step 3.  if u  ~  n then return u- n else return u 22 
An important feature of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm is  that 
it does involve multiplication modulo r  and division by r rather than division 
by n. 
Since preprocessing and postprocessing operations (converting from residue 
ton-residue, computing n', and converting the result back to ordinary residue) 
are rather time-consuming, it is  not a good idea to use the Montgomery prod­
uct computation algorithm when a single modular multiplication is  to be per­
formed.  It is more suitable when several modular multiplications with respect 
to the same modulus n are needed.  Such is the case for modular exponentiation, 
i.e.,  computation of xe  (mod n).  Using the binary method for  computing the 
powers [5],  we replace the exponentiation operation by a series of squarring and 
multiplication operations modulo n. Let (ek_1, ek_2, ...  , e0) be the binary expan­
sion of the exponent e.  The exponentiation algorithm computes z =  xe(mod n) 
with O(k)  calls to the Montgomery multiplication algorithm.  Step 4  of the 
modular exponentiation algorithm computes y using y via the property of the 
Montgomery algorithm:  MontMult(y, 1)  =  y.l.r-1 =  y.r.r-1 =  y mod n. 
function ModExp(x, e, n) 
Step 1.  x = x.r mod n 
Step 2.  y =  l.r mod n 
Step 3.  for i = k - 1 downto 0 
Step 4.  y =  MontMult(y, y) 
Step 5.  if ei = 1 then y = MontMult(y, x) 
Step 6.  return y := MontMult(y, 1) 
Thus, we  are converting the ordinary residue x  into its n-residue x using 
a  division-like operation.  This latter operation can be achieved by a series of 
shift and substract operations.  Additionally, Steps 2 and 3 require divisions. 
However, once the preprocessing is complete, the inner loop of the binary expo­
nentiation method uses the Montgomery product operation which performs only 23 
multiplications modulo 2k and division by 2k.  The binary method produces the 
n-residue z of the quantity z = xe  (mod n).  Then, the ordinary residue is  ob­
tained from then-residue by executing the MontMult function with arguments 
y and 1.  This is easily shown to be correct, since 
y =  y.r (mod n) 
immediately implies that 
y  y.r-1  (mod n) 
y.l.r-
1  (mod n) 
MontMult(y, 1). 
The resulting algorithm is quite fast and efficient, as has been demonstrated by 
many researchers and engineers.  An implementation example can be found in 
[2]. 
In typical implementations, operations on large numbers are performed by 
breaking the numbers into words.  If w is the word size of the computer, then 
a number can be thought of as a sequence of integers each represented in radix 
W  =  2w.  If these "multi-precision"  numbers require  s  words in the radix W 
representation, then we  take r  as r  =  2sw.  However,  the above algorithm can 
be  refined  and made more efficient,  particularly when  the numbers involved 
are multi-precision integers.  The paper by  Dusse and Kaliski in [2]  describes 
improved  algorithms,  including a  simple and efficient  way  for  computing n'. 
The modular exponentiation algorithm is  used  in cryptography.Examples are 
the ElGamal signature scheme  [3],  and the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
of the National Institute for Standards and Technology [15]. 
In the following  sections,  we  will present several improved algorithms for 
performing Montgomery multiplication MontMult(x, y)  [9]  and analyze the im­
pact of our special primes with respect to their time requirements.  The time 24 
analysis is performed by counting the total number of multiplications, additions 
(substractions and shifts:  ~), and memory read and write operations in terms 
of the input size parameter s.  For example the following operation 
(C, S) := t[i + j] + a[j] *b[i] + C 
is assumed to require three memory reads, two additions, and one multiplication 
since  most microprocessors multiply two  one-word  numbers,  leaving the two­
word result in one or two registers.  Similarly the following operation 
(C, S)  := t[i] + m ~ a 
is assumed to require two memory reads and two additions. 
Multi-precision integers are assumed to reside in memory throughout the 
computations.  Therefore, the assignment operation performed within a routine 
corresponds to the read or write operation between a  register and memory . 
They are counted to calculate the proportion of the memory access  time in 
the total running time of the Montgomery  multiplication algorithm.  In our 
analysis,  loop or conditional construct establishment and index computations 
are  not taken into account.  The only  registers  we  assume  are available  are 
those to hold the carry C and the sum S  as above (or equivalently borrow and 
difference  for  subtraction).  Obviously,  in many microprocessors there will  be 
more registers,  but this gives  a first-order approximation of the running time, 
sufficient for a general comparison of the algorithms. 
3.4  Optimizing Montgomery Product using Special Primes 
Several families of special primes have already been exploited in order to speed 
up modular arithmetic.  In [4],  the authors take advantage of the elliptic curve 
prime modulus- p = e2a ± 1, where the leading coefficients are within a word­
to implement fast arithmetic. In [11], a fast reduction method is described using 
prime modulus of the form  bt ± c,  where c is an l-digit base b positive integer 25 
(for  some  l  <  t).  Another family  special  prime modulus,  called  generalized 
Mersenne numbers,  provides more efficient  modular multiplication.  Mersenne 
primes are of the form 264kt-l ± 264kt-2  ± ... ± 264ko  ± 1,  where kt's are usually 
very short integers (less than ten). 
In this thesis, we  are introducing a new family of special primes which are 
primes of the form  2k  + 2i ± 1  (for  some  integers k  and i where  k  >  i).  In 
the sequel,  we  will  analyze and optimize Montgomery algorithms based on a 
subfamily of primes p, 
2k + 2i + 1, 
k, i  E  N,  k  > i.  The advantage of such  primes is  that they have only 3 bits 
set to 1:  the most  significant  bit,  the least significant  bit and a  middle bit. 
Hence, instead of processing all words in the modulus as in standard modular 
multiplication, we  process only the words containing the bits set to 1.  In any 
case, we will be processing only three words (actually only two words because the 
least significant word will be processed in the initial settings of the algorithm). 
The organization of the algorithms we  will  analyze is  based on  two  fac­
tors.  The first  factor is whether multiplication and reduction are separated or 
integrated.  In the separated approach,  we  first  multiply x  and y,  then per­
form  a  Montgomery reduction.  This integration can be either  coarse-grained 
or fine-grained,  depending on how often we  switch between multiplication and 
reduction (specifically, after processing an array of words, or just one word). 
The second factor is  the general form of the multiplication and reduction 
steps.  One form  is  the operand scanning, where an outer loop moves through 
words of one of the operands; another form is  the product scanning, where the 
loop moves through words of the product itself. It is possible for multiplication 
to have one form and reduction to have the other form,  even in the integrated 
approach. 
In this thesis, we will focus on the optimization of five main implementations 
of the Montgomery  multiplication  (implemented  in  C).  These  methods have 26 
been described and analyzed previously in  [9].  In the sequel,  we  will  further 
analyze and enhance them.  These algorithms are the following: 
•  Separated Operand Scanning (SOS)  (Section 5) 
•  Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (  CIOS)  (Section 6) 
•  Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) (Section 7) 
•  Finely Integrated Product Scanning (FIPS) (Section 8) 
•  Coarsely Integrated Hybrid Scanning (CIHS)  (Section 9) 
In the next sections, we  will optimize these methods using special primes 
of the form 2k + 2i + 1. 
3.5  Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) Method 
In this section, we  first  briefly analyze the SOS  algorithm.  Following this, we 
study the different optimization points of the algorithm using prime modulus 
of the form 2k + 2i + 1.  In the last subsection, we give a theoretical speed up of 
the new optimized algorithm for different field sizes. 
3.5.1  SOS Method with Arbitrary Primes 
The first method to be optimized in this thesis, for computing MontMult(x, y), 
is  what is  called  the Separated Operand Scanning method (see  [9]).  In this 
method, we  first  compute the product and then we  reduce it.  The complete 
separation of the product and the reduction computation makes this method 
suitable for  special  prime optimization.  The product is  performed with two 
embedded loops.  Each loop goes through the index of one of the operands and 
the inner j-loop updates the final  product array t  by adding the appropriate 
word product and carry.  The result x.y is computed as follows: 27 
for  i=O  to  s-1 
c  :=  0 
for  j=O  to  s-1 
(C,S)  := t[i+j]  + x[j]*y[i]  +  C 
t[i+j]  s 
t [i+s]  :=  C 
The final value is the 2s-word integer t which is initially assumed to be zero. 
The next step is to nullify the lower half of the product residing in t.  To do so, 
we  add the product m.n tot, where m = t.n' mod r.  The code below updates 
t  in order to compute t + m.n. 
for  i=O  to  s-1 
c  0 
m  :=  t[i]*n'[O]  mod  W 
for  j=O  to  s-1 
(C,S)  := t[i+j]  + m*n[j]  +  C 
t[i+j]  := s 
ADD(t[i+s],C) 
Since m  = t.n' mod r  and the reduction process  proceeds word by word, 
we  can use  n~ =  n' mod 2w  instead of n'.  This observation was first  made in 
(2],  and applies to all five  methods optimized in this thesis.  The ADD  function 
shown above performs a carry propagation, adding C to the input array given by 
the first argument.  Starting from the first element(t [i+s] ), it then propagates 
the carry until no further carry is  generated.  The computed value of t is  then 
divided by r  which is  realized by simply ignoring the lower s words oft.  The 
following code describes this division. 
for  j=O  to  s 

u[j]  t[j+s] 
28 
Finally, the multi-precision substraction in Step 3 of MontMult is computed 
(for details see [9]).  Step 3 is performed the same way for all algorithms analyzed 
in this thesis, and requires 2s + 2 additions, memory reads and memory writes 
The value  n~, which is  defined as the inverse of the least significant word 
of n  modulo 2w,  i.e.,  n~ =  -n0
1  (mod  2w),  can be computed using a simple 
algorithm described in [2]. 
The total number of operations is  calculated by  counting each operation 
within a loop, and multiplying this number by the iteration count.  Table 3.1 
below gives a breakdown of the operations performed in the SOS algorithm. It 
requires 2s2 + s multiplications, 4s2 +4s + 2 additions, 6s2 +7s +3 reads, and 
2s2 + 7s + 3 writes.  The ADD  function is  counted as two  memory reads,  two 
additions, and two memory writes in this analysis [9]. 
Table 3.1. SOS method operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c := 0  0  0  0  0  s 
for j=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t(j] +  x[i]*y(j] +  C  1  2  3  0  .2 
t[i+j] := s  0  0  0  1  .2 
t[i+s] := C  0  0  0  0  s 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c :=0  0  0  0  0  s 
m  := t[i]*n'[O] mod W  1  0  2  1  s 
for j=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[i+j] +  m*n[j] +  C  1  2  3  0  .2 
t[i+j]:=S  0  0  0  1  .2 
ADD(t[i+s],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
for i=O to s  - - - - -
t[j] := t[j+s]  0  0  1  1  s +  1 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
I 2s2  +  s  I 4s2  +  4s +  2  6s2  +  1s +  3  2s2  +  1s +  3 29 
3.5.2  Optimized SOS Method with Special Primes 
Let the modulus p  be  2k1*w+a + 2ko*w+b + 1,  where w  is  the word size  of the 
machine architecture and k1 ,  k0 ,  a and b integers (k1  =  s- 1,  where s is  the 
size in words of the modulus p, 0 :::::;  a, b:::::; w- 1).  The binary expansion of pis 
(1k1 , 0, ... , 0, 1k0 , 0, ... , 0, 1). This decomposition of the field prime p will be used 
thru the remaining of this thesis. 
Since the multiplication part of the Montgomery product does not involve 
the modulus p, the optimization will focus on the reduction part. The original 
algorithm computes 
m  =  t[i] *n'[O]  mod W.  (3.7) 
Since n'[O]  =  -n[o]-1  (mod 2w),  we  can save this multiplication by judiciously 
choosing n'[O].  By chasing n[O] = 1, we obtain n'[O] = -1. This slightly restricts 
the range of possible modulus p  (k0  > 0).  Hence (3.7)  becomes 
m  -t[i] mod W 
m  -t[i] + 1, 
where -t[i]  is the bit complement of t[i]. 
The next optimization has to do with loop unrolling.  By unrolling the inner 
j-loop, we save the processing time required to compute the reduction steps for 
the words of the modulus that are equal to zero.  Indeed, if a given word of the 
modulus pis set to zero, then the final product t remains unchanged when that 
particular word is involved.  In addition, the carry of each word  level product 
is  not propagated anymore.  Therefore the propagation of the carry must be 
performed after each reduction step.  This latter step is carried out by the ADD 
function described in this previous section.  Since the modulus has only three 
non-zero words to process, the inner j-loop of the reduction part becomes: 30 
(C,S)  :=t[i]  +m*n[O]  +C  j=O 
t [i]  := s 
ADD(t[i+1] ,C) 
(C,S)  :=t[i+ko]  +m*n[ko]  j  = ko 
t [i + k0]  : = S 
ADD(t [i + k0 +  1] ,C) 
(C,S)  :=  t [i + k1]  + m*n[k1] 
t  [i +kd  := s 
ADD(t [i +  k1  + 1] ,C) 
And since  n[O]  =  1,  n[ko]  =  2b  and n[k1]  =  2a,  the unrolled code above 
becomes 
(C,S)  := t[i]  +  m  j=O 
t [i]  := s 
ADD(t[i+1] ,C) 
(C,S)  := t[i + k0]  +  m«b  j  =  ko 
t [i + k0]  :=  S 
ADD(t [i + k0 + 1] ,C) 
(C,S)  :=  t[i+k1]  + m«a 
t [i + kl]  := s 
ADD(t [i +  k1  + 1] ,C) 
Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of the operations performed in the optimized 
SOS algorithm. It requires s2 multiplications, 2s2+12s+2 additions, 3s2+13s-t3 
reads, and s2 +  12s + 3 writes. 
In the table above and in the following sections, we consider the substraction 
operation as an addition.  The shift operation («)is also counted as an addition. 31 
Table 3.2. Optimized SOS method operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations I 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c := 0  0  0  0  0  8 
for j=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[.j]  +  x[i]*y[.j]  +  C  1  2  3  0  82 
t[i+j] := s  0  0  0  1  82 
t[i+s] := C  0  0  0  1  8 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
m  := t[i] +  1  0  1  1  0  8 
ADD(t[i+1],1)  0  1  1  1  8 
(C, S) := t[i +  ko] +  m  < b  0  2  2  0  s 
t[i +  ko] := s  0  0  0  1  s 
ADD(t[i +  ko +  1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
(C, S) := t[i +  k1] +  m  <a  0  2  2  0  s 
t[i +  kl] := s  0  0  0  1  s 
ADD(t[i +  k1  +  1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
for i=O to s  - - - - -
t[.j]  := t[j+s]  0  0  1  1  s +  1 
Final Subtraction  0  2(8 +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
s 2  2s2 +12s+2  3s2 +13s+3  s 2 +11s+3 
The ADD  function, when the carry C is equal to one, is counted as one memory 
read, one addition, and one memory write. 
3.5.3  SOS Speed Improvement with Special Primes 
In this subsection, we give the theoretical speed improvement for each operation 
(multiplication, addition, memory read and write).  Since we are only processing 
three words of the modulus p,  the larger the modulus, the better the improve­
ment.  We  are obtaining over 50% of speed improvement for the multiplication 
operation whatever the field size is.  The next significant saving is in the memory 
read operation (starting from  24%  with 160  bits).  The other operations start 
contributing in higher field size  (192 bits and up).  Table 3.3 details theoretical 
gain. 32 
Table 3.3. SOS speed improvement breakdown 
Field Size 
Operations 
Multiplications  Additions  Memory Reads  Memory Writes 
p=l60 bits (s=5)  54.5%  8.2%  24.0%  5.7% 
p=l92 bits (s=6)  53.8%  14.1%  27.6%  10.3% 
p=256 bits (s=S)  53.0%  22.1%  32.5%  17.1% 
p=512 bits (s=l6)  51.5%  35.2%  40.7%  30.6% 
p=l024 bits (s=32)  50.8%  42.4%  45.2%  39.4% 
...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
p-+ oo  (s-+ oo)  50%  50%  50%  50% 
3.6  Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) Method 
The next  method,  the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning method,  inte­
grates the multiplication and reduction steps. 
3.6.1  CIOS Method with Arbitrary Primes 
Instead of computing the entire product x.y, then reducing, we alternate multi­
plication and reduction between the outer loops.  We can do this since the value 
of m  in the ith iteration of the outer loop for  reduction depends only on the 
value of t [i] , which is completely computed by the ith iteration of the outer 
loop of the multiplication.  Even though the multiplication and reduction steps 
are not compleley separate, this algorithm can still be optimized efficiently.  This 
is  due to the fact that the value of m  depends on the value of t [i] only.  The 
algorithm is detailed in the table 3.4. 
The last j-loop, the reduction loop, integrates the shifting of the result one 
word to the right  (i.e., division by 2w),  hence the reference to t [j]  and t [0] 
instead oft [i+j] and t [i]. 33 
Table 3.4. CIOS method operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c :=0  0  0  0  0  8 
for j=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[j] +  y[j]*x[i] +  C  1  2  3  0  82 
t[j] := s  0  0  0  1  82 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  8 
t[s] := S  0  0  0  1  8 
t[s+1J := C  0  0  0  1  8 
m  := t[OJ*n'[O]  mod W  1  0  2  1  8 
(C,S) := t[O]  +  m*n[O]  1  1  3  0  8 
for j=l to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[j] +  m*n[j] +  C  1  2  3  0  8(8- 1) 
t[j-1] := s  0  0  0  1  8(8- 1) 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  8 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  8 
t[s] := t[s+1] +  C  0  1  1  1  8 
Final Subtraction  0  2(8 +  1)  2(8 +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
I 2s2 +  s  4s2 +  4s +  2  6s2 +  7s +  2  2s2 +  5s +  2 
3.6.2  Optimized CIOS Method with Special Primes 
In the CIOS algorithm, m is computed as m = t[O] *n'[O] mod W, and after im­
provement, becomes m  =  -t[O] + 1.  Since the shifting to the right is integrated 
in the reduction step, unrolling the loop would not be very advantageous.  By 
moving the shifting to the right into the multiplication loop, we  can unroll the 
reduction j-loop. And the new multiplication loop becomes 
for  j=O  to  s-1 
(C,S)  t[j]  +  x[i]*y[j]  +  C 
[j-1]  s 
(C,S)  := t[s]  +  C 

t [s-1]  :=  S 

t[s]  :=  t[s+1]+C 
34 
The reduction step depends on the value of m.  Since m  is  a function of 
t [OJ,  we  need to unroll the multiplication loop for  j  =  0.  This gives  us  the 
following algorithm. 
for  i=O  to  s-1 

c  :=  0 

(C,S)  :=  t[OJ  +  y[OJ*x[iJ 

m  := -t  [OJ  +  1 

for  j=O  to  s-1 

(C,S)  t[jJ  +  b[jJ*a[iJ  +  C 
[j-1J  s 

(C,S)  := t[sJ  +  C 

t[s-1J  :=  S 

t [sJ  :=  t  [s+1J  +  C 

The reduction step is similar to the SOS reduction. 
s  :=  0;  c  :=  1  j=O 
ADD(t[OJ,C) 
(C, S)  := t  [k0 - 1J  +  m«b  j  = ko- 1 
t  [k0 - 1J  :=  S 
ADD(t [k0J ,C) 
(C,S)  := t[k1 -1]  + m«a 
t [kl -1]  := s 
ADD(t[klJ ,C) 
By moving the processing of the first  reduction step  (ADD ( t  [ 0J , 1) )  into 
the multiplication loop (  C  :=  C+1), we  can further optimize this method.  This 
can be done since the carry C is propagated starting from the same index of the 
product array t.  The final optimized algorithm with its operation breakdown is 
given in table 3.5. 35 
Table 3.5. Optimized CIOS operation breakdown 
Operations 
Iterations STATEMENT 
Read  Write Mult  Add 
- - - for i=O to s-1  - -
0  0  8 0  0 c :=0 
3 (C,S) := t(O]  +  y(O]*x(i]  1  1  0  8 
1  1  1  8 0 m  := t(O]  +  1 
0  0  8 0  1 c := c  +  1 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - -
1  2  3  0  8(8- 1) (C,S) := t(j] +  y(j]*x[i] +  C 
0  1  8(8- 1) t(j-1] := s  0  0 
1  0 0  1  8 (C,S) := t(s] +  C 
0  1  8 t(s-1] := S  0  0 
1  1  8 0  1 t(s] := t(s+1] +  C 
2 0  2  0  8 (C,S) := t(ko - 1]  +  m«b 
0  1  8 t[ko- 1]  := S  0  0 
2  2  2  8 ADD(t[ko],C)  0 
2 2  0  8 (C,S) := t[kt - 1]  +  m«a  0 
0  1  8 0  0 t(kt - 1]  := s 
2  2 ADD(t(kt],C)  0  2  8 
1 Final Subtraction  0  2(8 +  1)  2(s +  1) 2(8 +  1) 
s2  2s2 +  13s +  2  3s2 +  13s +  2  s2 +lOs+ 2 
3.6.3  CIOS Speed Improvement with Special Primes 
The multiplication operation shows again the best performance-over 50 percent 
of reduction.  This is actually the case for all five  algorithms optimized in this 
thesis.  The number of memory reads are also significantly reduced - starting 
from  24  percent  of improvement  at 160  bits  and  up  to 45  percent  at  1024 
bits.  The other operation reductions can be observed at higher field size values 
(192 bits and up).  The maximum theoretical improvement is 50 percent for all 
operations. Results are detailed in Table 3.6 36 
Table 3.6. CIOS speed improvement breakdown 
Field Size 
Multiplications 
Operations 
Additions  Memory Reads  Memory Writes 
p=160 bits (s=5}  54.5%  4.1%  24.1%  0% 
p=192 bits (s=6}  53.8%  10.6%  27.7%  5.8% 
p=256 bits (s=8}  53.0%  19.3%  32.6%  14.1% 
p=512 bits (s=16}  51.5%  33.8%  40.7%  29.6% 
p=1024 bits (s=32}  50.8%  41.6%  45.2%  39.1% 
...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
p-+ oo  (s-+ oo)  50%  50%  50%  50% 
3.7  Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) Method 
This method integrates the two  inner loops of the CIOS method into one by 
computing the multiplications and additions in the same loop. 
3.7.1  FIOS Method with Arbitrary Primes 
In this case t [0]  must be computed before entering the loop since m  depends 
on this value which corresponds to unrolling the first iteration of the loop for 
j  = 0. 
The difference between the CIOS method and this method is that the FIOS 
method has only one inner loop.  The use of the ADD  function is required in the 
inner j-loop since there are two distinct carries, one arising from the multipli­
cation and the other from the reduction.  This method requires about s2  more 
additions, writes, and reads than for the CIOS method. Table 3.7 describes the 
algorithm and its corresponding operation breakdown. 
3.7.2  Optimized FIOS Method with Special Primes 
The preliminary code (computing m) processed before entering the inner j-loop, 
is written as follows: 37 
Table 3.7. FIOS method operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[O]  +  x[O]*y[i]  1  1  3  0  s 
ADD(t[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
m  := S*n'[O] mod W  1  0  1  1  s 
(C,S) := S  +  m*n[OJ  1  1  2  0  s 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[j] +  b[j]*a[i] +  C  1  2  3  0  s(s- 1) 
ADD(t[j+1],C)  0  2  2  2  s(s- 1) 
(C,S) := S  +  m*n[j]  1  1  2  0  s(s- 1) 
t[.j-1]  := s  0  0  0  1  s(s- 1) 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  s 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  s 
t[s] := t[s+1] +  C  0  1  1  1  s 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
2s2 +  s  5s2 +  3s +  2  7s2 +  5s +  2  3s2 +  4s +  2 
for  i=O  to  s-1 

(C,S)  :=  t[O]  +  y[O]*x[i] 

ADD(t [1] ,C) 

m :=  S*n'[O]  mod  W 

(C,S)  :=  S  +  m*n[O] 

We can optimize this code by taking advantage of the pattern of the mod­
ulus array n.  After optimization, the above code becomes: 
for  i=O  to  s-1 

(C,S)  :=  t[O]  +  y[O]*x[i] 

ADD(t [1] ,C) 

m  -s  +  1 

c  c +  1 38 
Since the multiplication and reduction steps are finely integrated, the opti­
mization required some conditional constructs to be added.  The reduction line 
of the original code 
(C,S)  S  +  m*n[j] 
is transformed into 
if (j == k0 )  then 

(C,S)  :=  S  +  m<<b 

if  (j == k1)  then 

(C,S)  := S  +  m<<a 

Table 3.8 details the optimized FIOS algorithm. 
Table 3.8. Optimized FIOS operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t(O]  +  x(O]*y(i]  1  1  3  0  • 
m  := S +  1  0  1  0  1  • 
c := c  +  1  0  1  0  0  • 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t(j] +  y(j]*x(i] +  C  1  2  3  0  s(s- 1) 
ADD(t[j+1],C)  0  2  2  2  s(s- 1) 
if(j == ko) then  - - - - • 
(C, S) := S  +  m  < b  0  2  1  0  • 
if(j == kt) then  - - - - • 
(C, S) := S  +  m  < a  0  2  1  0  • 
t[j-1] := s  0  0  0  1  s(s- 1) 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  • 
t(s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  • 
t(s]  := t(s+1] +  C  0  1  1  1  • 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
s2  4s2 +  6s +  2  5s2 +  4s +  2  3s2 +  2s +  2 39 
3.7.3  FIOS Speed Improvement with Special Primes 
In the optimized FIOS method, the number of writes remains almost identi­
cal.  From the three algorithms optimized so  far, the FIOS method is the least 
improved one.  As for the SOS and CIOS methods, multiplications are best re­
duced, followed by memory reads.  The number of additions and memory writes 
are not significantly changed.  Table 3.9 shows the improvement. 
Table 3.9. FIOS speed improvement 
Field Size 
Operations 
Multiplications  Additions  Memory Reads  Memory Writes 
p=l60 bits (s=!l)  54.5%  3.5%  27.3%  10.3% 
p=192 bits <•=6)  53.8%  6.0%  27.5%  9.0% 
p=2!16 bits (s=8)  53.0%  9.2%  27.8%  7.1% 
p=!l12 bits (•=16)  51.5%  14.4%  28.2%  3.8% 
p=l024 bits (s=32)  50.8%  17.2%  28.4%  2.0% 
...  ...  ...  ...  .. . 
p-+ oo  (s-+ oo)  50%  20%  28.6%  0% 
3.8  Finely Integrated Product Scanning (FIPS) Method 
Like the previous method, the FIPS method interleaves the computations of the 
product and the reduction.  However, in this case, both computations are in the 
product-scanning form. 
3.8.1  FIPS Method with Arbitrary Primes 
The first outer loop computes the product and reduces it. The three-word array 
ace, i.e., ace [0],  ace [1] ,  ace [2] , is used as the partial product accumulator 
for the product x.y and m.n. The use of a three-word array assumes that s < 2w 
(see  [9]).  The algorithm can be easily modified to handle a larger accumulator. 
In this loop, the ith word of m  is  computed using  n~ and stored in t [i], and 40 
then the least significant word of m.n is added to t.  Since the least significant 
word oft always becomes zero, the shifting can be can be carried out one word 
at a time in each iteration.  The second i-loop completes the computation by 
forming the final  result in the memory space of t.  The most significant bit of 
the result remains in ace [0]  (the values ace [1]  and ace [2]  are zero  at the 
end).  The complete algorithm is described in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10. FIPS algorithm operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for  i=O to s-1  - - - - -
for j=O to i-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[.j]*y[i-j]  1  1  3  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8(8 - 1)/2 
(C,S) := S  +  t[.j]*n[i-j]  1  1  2  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
acc[O]  := S  0  0  0  1  8(8 - 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s(8 - 1)/2 
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[i]*y[O]  1  1  3  0  8 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8 
t[i] := S*n'[O] mod W  1  0  1  1  8 
(C,S) := S  +  t[i]*n[O]  1  1  2  0  8 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8 
acc[O]  := acc[1]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[1] := acc[2]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[2] := 0  0  0  0  1  8 
for i=s to 2s-1  - - - - -
for j=i-s+1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[.j]*y[i-j]  1  1  3  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8(8 - 1)/2 
(C,S) := S  +  t[j]*n[i-j]  1  1  2  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
acc[O]  := S  0  0  0  1  8(8 - 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8(8 - 1)/2 
t[i-s] := acc[O]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[O]  := acc[1]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[1] := acc[2]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[2] := 0  0  0  0  1  8 
Final Subtraction  0  2(8 +  1)  2(8 +  1)  2(8 +  1)  1 
2s2 +  s  6s2 +  2s +  2  9s2 +  8s +  2  5s2 +  9s +  2 41 
3.8.2  Optimized FIPS Method for Special Primes 
Since both i-loops compute partly the reduction, some conditional constructs 
need to be added in both loops for optimization.  Before optimization the mul­
tipication and reduction code is as follows: 
for  j=O  to i-1 

(C,S)  :=  acc[O]  +  x[j]*y[i-j] 

ADD (ace [1] , C) 

(C,S)  :=  S  +  t[j]*n[i-j] 

ADD(acc[1] ,C) 

ace [0]  :=  S 

After optimization, the multiplication and reduction code becomes: 
for  j=O  to  i-1 

(C,S)  :=  acc[O]  +  x[j]*y[i-j] 

ADD(acc [1] ,C) 

if ((i- j) == k0 )  then 

(C, S)  := S  +  t [j] «b 
ADD(acc[1],C) 
if ((i- j) == k1)  then 
(C,S)  :=  S  + t[j]«a 
ADD(acc[1],C) 
ace [0]  := S 
A similar optimization can be carried out in the second i-loop.  In addition, 
the line of code t[i)  := S *n'[O)  mod W, is optimized as 
t[iJ  =  -s + 1. 
Table 3.11 gives the complete optimized algorithm. 42 
Table 3.11. Optimized FIPS algorithm operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
for j=1 to i-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[j]*y[i-j]  1  1  3  0  s(s- 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s(s - 1)/2 
if ((i- j) == ko) then  - - - - -
(C,S) := S  +  t[j] «  b  0  2  1  0  s 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
if ((i- j) == kl) then  - - - - -
(C,S) := S  +  t[j] «  a  0  2  1  0  s 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
acc[O]  := S  0  0  0  1  s(s ­ 1)/2 
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[i]*y[O]  1  1  3  0  s 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
t[i] := §  +  1  0  1  0  1  s 
ADD(acc[1],1)  0  1  1  1  s 
acc[O]  := acc[1]  0  0  1  1  s 
acc[1] := acc[2]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[2] := 0  0  0  0  1  8 
for i=s to 2s-1  - - - - -
for j=i-s+1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := acc[O]  +  x[j]*y[i-j]  1  1  3  0  s(8 - 1)/2 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s(s ­ 1)/2 
if ((i- j) == ko) then  - - - - -
(C,S) := S  +  t[j] «  b  0  2  1  0  s 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  8 
if ((i- j) == kl) then  - - - - -
(C,S) := S  +  t[j] «  a  0  2  1  0  s 
ADD(acc[1],C)  0  2  2  2  s 
acc[O]  := S  0  0  0  1  s(8 - 1)/2 
t[i-s] := acc[O]  0  0  1  1  s 
acc[O]  := acc[1]  0  0  1  1  8 
acc[1] := acc[2]  0  0  1  1  s 
acc[2] := 0  0  0  0  1  s 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(8 +  1)  1 
s 2  3s2 +  20s +  2  5s2 +  20s +  2  3s2 +  18s +  2 
3.8.3  FIPS Speed Improvement with Special Primes 
In the FIPS algorithm, the speed improvement is quite considerable too.  How­
ever,  we  must not forget  that some conditional constructs have  been added. 
Table 3.12 details theoretical results. 43 
Table 3.12. FIPS speed improvement 
Field Size 
Operations 
Multiplications  Additions  Memory Reads  Memory Writes 
p=160 bits (s=5)  54.5%  -9.3%  15.0%  2.9% 
p=192 bits (s=6)  53.8%  0%  19.2%  7.6% 
p=256 bits (s=8)  53.0%  11.9%  24.9%  14.2% 
p=512 bits (s=16)  51.5%  30.6%  34.2%  25.8% 
p=1024 bits (s=32)  50.8%  40.2%  39.2%  32.5% 
...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
p-+ oo  (s-+ oo)  50%  50%  44%  40% 
3.9  Coarsely Integrated Hybrid Scanning (CIHS) Method 
This method is a modified version of the SOS algorithm, illustrating yet another 
approach to the Montgomery multiplication.  This method uses less temporary 
space  than the SOS  method without changing the general  flow  of the algo­
rithm.  It is  called "hybrid scanning"  because it mixes  the product-scanning 
and operand-scanning forms  of multiplication while the reduction remains in 
the operand-scanning form. 
3.9.1  CIHS Method with Arbitrary Primes 
The computation of x.y is split into two loops.  The computation of the first half 
of the product is  sufficient to process the reduction.  The second i-loop alter­
nates operand-scanning reduction and multiplication.  The splitting is possible 
because the computation of m  requires only the ith word of the product. Thus 
the multiplication of x.y can be simplified by postponing the computation of the 
most significant half to the second i-loop.  Table 3.13 below gives the detailed 
algorithm. 44 
Table 3.13. CIHS operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations 
Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c := 0  0  0  0  0  8 
for j=O to s-i-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[i+j] +  x[j]*y[i] +  C  1  2  3  0  8(8 +  1)/2 
t[i+j] := s  0  0  0  1  8(8 +  1)/2 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  8 
t[s] := S  0  0  0  1  8 
t[s+1] := C  0  0  0  1  8 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
m  := t[O]*n'[O] mod W  1  0  2  1  8 
(C,S) := t[O]  +  m*n[O]  1  1  3  0  8 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[j] +  m*n[j] +  C  1  2  3  0  8(8- 1) 
t[j-1] := s  0  0  0  1  8(8- 1) 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  8 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  8 
t[s] := t[s+1] +  C  0  1  1  1  8 
t[s+1] := 0  0  0  0  1  8 
for j=i+1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[s-1] +  y[j]*x[s-j+i]  1  1  3  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  8(8 - 1)/2 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  8(8 - 1)/2 
t[s] := S  0  0  0  1  8(8 - 1)/2 
t[s+1] := C  0  0  0  1  8(8 - 1)/2 
Final Subtraction  0  2(8 +  1)  2(8 +  1)  2(8 +  1)  1 
2s2 +  s  4s2 +  4s +  2  6.5s2 +  6.5s +  2  3s2 +  6s +  2 
3.9.2  Optimized CIHS Method for  Special Primes 
In this algorithm, the optimization takes place in the second j-loop_  The com­
putation of m  within the second i-loop is performed as follows: 
m  := t[OJ*n'[OJ  mod  W 

(C,S)  t  [OJ  +  m*n [OJ 

Here, we  also take advantage of the modulus pattern to save two multipli­
cation operations_  The optimized code becomes m  :=  -t  [OJ  +  1;  C  :=  1. 45 
The reduction j-loop 
for  j=1  to  s-1 
(C,S)  :=  t [j]  +  m*n[j]  +  C 
t  [j-1]  s 
is optimized as 
for  j=1  to  s-1 
ADD (t [j] , C) 
if (j == k0 )  then 
(C,S)  := t[k0]  +  m « b 
if  (j == k1)  then 
(C,S)  := t[kd  +  m «a 
t[j-1]  := s 
Table 3.14 outlines the optimized breakdown of the CIHS method. 
3.9.3  CIHS Speed Improvement with Special Primes 
With this method,  we  end up having more memory writes in the optimized 
version than the original.  However,  the number of multiplications,  additions 
and memory reads go  down significantly, which gives us an interesting overall 
optimization.  Theoretical results are given in Table 3.15 
3.10  Montgomery Algorithm and ECDSA Timings 
In this section, we show timings for the five  Montgomery multiplication method 
(SOS,  CIOS,  FIOS,  FIPS and CIHS)  and compare  them to their optimized 
versions.  We  also show the impact of the CIOS method on the Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature (ECDSA). The computation is based on C source codes com­46 
Table 3.14. Optimized CIHS operation breakdown 
STATEMENT 
Operations  Iterations 
Mult  Add  Read  Write 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
c :=0  0  0  0  0  s 
for j=O to s-i-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[i+i] +  x[j]*y[i] +  C  1  2  3  0  s(s +  1)/2 
t[i+il := s  0  0  0  1  s(s +  1)/2 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  s 
t[s] := S  0  0  0  1  s 
t[s+1] := C  0  0  0  1  s 
for i=O to s-1  - - - - -
m  := t[O]  +  1  0  1  1  1  s 
c := 1  0  0  0  0  s 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - -
ADD(t[j],C)  0  1  1  1  s(s- 1) 
if (j == ko) then  - - - - s- 1 
(C,S) := t[ko] +  m  « b  0  2  2  0  s- 1 
if (j == kl) then  - - - - s- 1 
(C,S) := t[k1l +  m  « a  0  2  2  0  s- 1 
t[j-1] := s  0  0  0  1  s(s- 1) 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  s 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  s 
t[s] := t[s+1] +  C  0  1  1  1  s 
t[s+1] := 0  0  0  0  1  s 
for j=i+1 to s-1  - - - - -
(C,S) := t[s-1] +  y[j]*x[s-i+i]  1  1  3  0  s(s ­ 1)/2 
t[s-1] := S  0  0  0  1  s(s ­ 1)/2 
(C,S) := t[s] +  C  0  1  1  0  s(s ­ 1)/2 
t[s] := S  0  0  0  1  s(s ­ 1)/2 
t[s+1] := C  0  0  0  1  s(s ­ 1)/2 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  2(s +  1)  1 
piled with Microsoft Visual C++ 5.0.  An Intel Pentium II 32-bit microprocessor 
running at 450 Mhz was used to conduct the benchmarking. 
To  compute the timings,  we  choose curves E  defined  over the finite  field 
GF(p)  :  E  :  y
2  =  x
3 +Ax+ B, where  A, B  E  GF(p) with 4A
3  +  27B
2  #­
0  (mod  p).  For  the mathematical background,  see  [6].  While  A  and B  are 
randomly chosen, the values of p  are judiciously selected as described in table 
3.16 (for a listing of low-weight special primes see Appendix A and B). 47 
Table 3.15. CIHS speed improvement 
Field Size 
Operations 
Multiplications  Additions  Memory Reads  Memory Writes 
p=160 bits (s=5)  54.5%  3.3%  22.3%  -18.7% 
p=192 bits (s=6)  53.8%  5.9%  23.3%  -20.5% 
p=256 bits (s=8)  53.0%  9.7%  24.7%  -23.1% 
p=512 bits (s=16)  51.5%  16.5%  27.3%  -27.7% 
p=1024 bits (s=32)  50.8%  20.5%  29.0%  -30.4% 
...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
p-+ oo  (s-+ oo)  50%  25%  31%  -33% 
Table 3.16. Special primes used for timings 
Field Size  p 
160 bits  2159 + 2107 + 1 
192 bits  2191 + 2111 + 1 
256 bits  2255 + 2166 + 1 
512 bits  2511 +  2322 + 1 
1024 bits  21023 + 2249 + 1 
3.10.1  Running Times for Montgomery Algorithms 
The tables  in  the following  subsections  show  the actual performance of our 
optimized Montgomery algorithms.  We  are comparing our new approaches of 
field multiplication and modular reduction using special primes to the classical 
methods. 
3.10.1.1  SOS Method 
For the SOS method, the timing results show about 28 percent of improvement 
with 160-bit fields and close to 50 percent with 1024-bit fields  (see Table 3.17). 
This method shows the best improvement among all five  algorithms. 48 
Table 3.17. SOS timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  6.9/'S  51'S  28% 
192 bits  9.6/'S  6.11'S  37% 
256 bits  15.81'S  9.81'S  38% 
512 bits  57.21'S  30.5~ts  47% 
1024 bits  216.5~ts  106.51'S  51% 
3.10.1.2  CIOS Method 
For the CIOS method, the timing results show from 30 percent (160-bit field) to 
close to 50 percent (1024-bit field)  improvement (see Table 3.18).  Even though 
this method doesn't give the best improvement, it is still the fastest of all five 
methods. 
Table 3.18. CIOS timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  5.6/'S  3.91'S  30% 
192 bits  7.9/'S  5.4~ts  32% 
256 bits  13.4~ts  8.71'S  35% 
512 bits  47.3~ts  26.9~ts  43.1% 
1024 bits  1901'S  99~ts  48% 
3.10.1.3  FIOS Method 
With the FIOS method, the performance deteriorates.  The results (Table 3.19) 
show very little improvement for 160-bit (  4 percent) field size and is even slower 
than the original algorithm for larger field size (-15  percent for 1024 bit). This 
is due to conditional constructs added in the optimized version. 49 
Table 3.19. FIOS timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  5.2J'S  51'S  4% 
192 bits  7.3J'S  6.9J'S  5.5% 
256 bits  12.3J'S  13.2J'S  -7.5% 
512 bits  43.6J'S  49J'S  -12% 
1024 bits  1731'S  1991'S  -15% 
3.10.1.4  FIPS Method 
The FIPS method shows  from  20  percent to 38  percent improvement  in  the 
160-1024 bit range (see Table 3.20). 
Table 3.20. FIPS timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  6.9J'S  5.5J'S  20% 
192 bits  9.5J'S  7.6J'S  20% 
256 bits  16.5J'S  12.21'S  26% 
512 bits  62.4J'S  40J'S  36% 
1024 bits  248J'S  1531'S  38% 
3.10.1.5  CIHS Method 
The CIHS method shows the least performance improvement ranging from 4 to 
7.5 percent (see Table 3.21). 
3.10.2  Running Times for ECDSA Using CIOS Method 
We replaced the standard Montgomery algorithm by our optimized CIOS method, 
and observed the impact of our work on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature. 50 
Table 3.21. CIHS timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  6.5JLS  6.2JLS  4% 
192 bits  9.4JLS  9.0JLS  4% 
256 bits  15.7JLS  15.0JLS  4.5% 
512 bits  56.3JLS  52.3JLS  7% 
1024 bits  213JLS  197JLS  7.5% 
Table 3.22 shows a comparison of the running time for the Elliptic Curve Dig­
ital Signature.  The fastest multiplication scheme,  the CIOS method was used 
for  the signature timing.  The impact on  the signature ranges  from  15  per­
cent for  160-bit prime field  to nearly 40  percent for  1024-bit prime field.  The 
improvement then stagnates around 42-43 percent for higher field sizes. 
Table 3.22. ECDSA timings and improvement 
Field Size  Classical Method  Improved Method  Percentage Improvement 
160 bits  16.65ms  14.15ms  15% 
192 bits  24.87ms  20.65ms  17% 
256 bits  52.35ms  40.82ms  22% 
512 bits  32lms  219ms  32% 
1024 bits  2289ms  1401ms  39% 51 
Chapter 4 

CONCLUSIONS 

This chapter summarizes the results of this thesis,  lists the most significant 
contributions, and finally discusses future research directions in this area. 
4.1  Discussion of Results 
In this thesis we studied the optimization of Montgomery algorithms using spe­
cial primes of the form 2k + 2i + 1.  The optimized algorithms presented in this 
thesis reduce by half the required number of multiplications in the Montgomery 
product.  The fastest method (CIOS) requires s2  multiplications, 2s2 + 13s + 2 
additions, 3s2 + 13s + 2 memory reads and s2 +lOs+ 2 writes. 
Chapter 3 is  based on the paper [9].  In this chapter, we  proposed a  new 
reduction method for performing the standard and Montgomery multiplication 
operations in GF(k).  The proposed method yields word-level algorithms, en­
abling software implementations for finite field arithmetic operations which find 
applications most notably in elliptic curve cryptography.  We  analyzed the the 
algorithms in details and their complexity in terms of the number of basic arith­
metic operations.  The proposed algorithms (optimized SOS,  CIOS, FIPS, and 
CIHS)  are more efficient  than the previously published results in terms of the 
number of operations  (multiplications,  additions,  memory reads,  and writes) 
used.  In the FIOS case, we obtain better performance for low field sizes only. 
In order to measure the actual performance of these algorithms,  we  have 
implemented them in C  on  an Intel Pentium II 450  Mhz  system.  Tables  in 
Section 3.10  summarize the timings of these methods for  different  field  sizes 
(160,  192,  256,  512  and 1024 bits).  The timings given  are the average values 52 
over several thousand executions.  Table 3.22 summarizes the average signature 
(ECDSA) times over a thousand executions.  By judiciously choosing the Mont­
gomery multiplication algorithm, we can achieve from over 30 percent to over 50 
percent of improvement in the modular multiplication and from over 15 percent 
to close to 40 percent of speed up in the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature. 
As analyzed in [9],  CIOS was operating faster on the selected Intel Pentium­
50 Linux system compared to the other Montgomery multiplication algorithms. 
However,  on our Intel Pentium II platform,  FIOS happened to be preferable 
in the non-optimized cases.  This is  mainly due to the hardware architecture 
(caching system,  memory accesses)  which makes the looping constructs more 
efficient in the FIOS method.  In the optimized cases, the CIOS performs faster 
since the conditional constructs added in the FIOS method slow it down signif­
icantly and make it the slowest of all five  optimized methods. 
On a general-purpose processor, the optimized CIOS is  probably best, as 
it is the simplest of all five  methods, requires fewer  operations than the other 
four methods, and can be used to obtain fast software implementation of the 
exponentiation over the field GF(p). 
4.2  Summary of Contributions 
Below is the summary of the contributions made: 
•  A new set of special primes suitable for fast field  arithmetic. 
•  A new word-level optimized reduction scheme for integer arithmetic. 
•  Five optimized versions of Montgomery multiplication algorithms. 
•  Detailed analyses of all methods proposed 
•  Fast elliptic curve digital signature implementation 53 
4.3  Future Work 

This work  can be continued with a  focus  on primes of the form  2k + 2i  - 1. 
This would give us an alternative to the algorithms we studied in the event that 
we  could not find  a prime of the form  2k + 2i + 1 for  a given field size.  From 
our experimental results (see Appendices A and B), we  can notice that for any 
field size  (verified for primes up to 1024 bits) there exists at least one prime of 
the form  2k + 2i ± 1.  Even though the optimized algorithms for  the set  2k + 
2i - 1 versions can yield more complex and less efficient algorithms than the set 
studied in this thesis, their frequency might make them more interesting.  Future 
research with this alternative set may bring up totally different optimization 
points.  Another subfamily of special primes than could be of interest is  the 
2k + 2J + 2i + 1 subfamily (k, j, i  E  N,  k  > j  > i).  To extend this research 
on special primes, we  could also focus on the bit pattern of primes of the form 
e2a + 1,  where  e is  within a  machine word  (one  multiplication operation for 
e2a +1 primes instead of two shift operations for 2k +2i +1 primes). Interesting 
comparisons between the 2k + 2i + 1 and e2a + 1 sets could be carried out. 54 
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Appendix A 

Table of Low-Weight Special Primes:  p = 2k + 2i + 1 

Field Size  (k,i) tuples 
64 

65 

66  (65,47) 

67  (66,59),(66,63) 

68  (67,37),(67,54),(67,66) 

69  (68,41),(68,65) 

70  (69,34),(69,36),(69,43),(69,44),(69,55),(69,58) 

71  (70,67) 

72  (71,66) 

73 

74  (73,36),(73,39),(73,52),(73,55) 

75  (74,57) 

76  (75,55),(75,61),(75,66) 

77  (76,33) 

78  (77,51),(77,75) 

79  (78,51) 

80  (79,34),(79,57) 

81  (80,33) 

82  (81,39),(81,44),(81,52) 

83  (82,75) 

84  (83,38),(83,53) 

85  (84,81) 

86  (85,39),(85,42),(85,52) 

87  (86,35),(86,71) 

88  (87,59),(87,67),(87,73),(87,85) 

89 

90 

91  (90,41),(90,57),(90,65),(90,75) 

92  (91,34),(91,57),(91,61),(91,66),(91,70),(91,85) 

93  (92,81) 

94  (93,55),(93,67),(93,79) 

95  (94,81) 

96  (95,39),(95,63) 

97 

98  (97,55) 

99  (98,33),(98,41),(98,65),(98,93) 

100  (99,66),(99,93) 
101  (100,49) 
102  (101,44),(101,62) 58 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
103 
104  (103,90) 
105 
106  (105,34),(105,36)'(105,52),(105,54)'(105,62) 
107  (106,69),(106,79),(106,91) 
108  (107,42),(107,62) ,(107'74) ,(107'77) ,(107,89),(107,90) 
109  (108,33) 
110 
111  (110,83),(110,89) 
112  (111,90) 
113 
114  (113,42)'(113,60),(113,63),(113,66),(113,80),(113,84)' ( 113,90) 
115  (114,55) ,(114,69),(114,77),(114,79),(114,95) 
116  (115,79) 
117 
118  (117,43),(117,51) 
119  (118,91),(118,111) 
120  (119,50),(119,66),(119,107),(119,110) 

121 

122  (121,79),(121,100) 

123  (122,53) 

124  (123,89),(123,118) 

125  (124,61) 

126  (125,66),(125,102),(125,116) 

127  (126,39),(126,67)'(126,85),(126,109) 

128  (127,93) ,(127,102) ,(127,105) ,(127,106) 

129 

130  (129,86),(129,127) 

131  (130,51),(130,99) 

132  (131 ,42),(131 ,47),(131 ,87) ,(131 ,89) 

133  (132,45),(132,81) 

134  (133,60) 

135 

136  (135,54)'(135,75) ,(135'102)'(135'126)'(135,129) 

137  (136,121) 

138  (137,36)'(137,50),(137,54),(137,92)'(137'114)'(137'134) 

139  (138,85),(138,109), 

140  (139,66) 

141 

142  (141 ,36),(141 ,44),(141 ,51) ,(141 ,62) 

143  (142,45) 

144  (143,38),(143,87)'(143,95),(143,114)'(143,126) 

145  (144,65) 

146 

147  (146,59),(146,65),(146,129) 

148  (147,41)'(147,61)'(147'77)'(147'90) ,(147'93)'(147,95)'(147'101)'(147'129) 

149  (148,33) 

150  (149,47),(149,78),(149,119) ,(149,138) 

151  (150,67) ,(150,79),(150,99),(150,135) 

152  (151 ,34),(151 ,81) ,(151 ,90),(151 ,109),(151 ,127),(151,147) 

153 
59 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
154  (153,34),(153,40) ,(153,44),(153,62)'(153,70)' ( 153'75) ' ( 153,82)'(153,139) 
155  (154,45),(154,69),(154,87),(154,99) ,(154,11 7) 
156  (155,89),(155,122) 

157  (156,133) 

158  (157,60),(157'79),(157,151) 

159  (158,45),(158,143) 

160  (159,59)'(159,63),(159,107)'(159'135) 

161 

162  (161,36),(161 '72),(161 ,92),(161 ,99),(161,122) 

163  (162,93),(162'145)'(162'147) ,(162,153) 

164  (163,82) ,(163,106),(163,150) 

165  (164,81) 

166  (165,111),(165,151),(165,162) 

167  (166,63),(166,69),(166,75),(166,117),(166,141) 

168  (167,86),(167,90),(167,111) 

169  (168,105) 

170  (169,90) 

171  (170,83),(170,89) 

172  (171,141),(171,154) 

173  (172,81),(172,117) 

174  (173,102),(173,155) 

175  (174,43),(174,57),(174,115),(174,151),(174,165) 

176  (175,34),(175,51),(175,57),(175,114),(175,121 ),(175,133),(175,142),(175,147) 

177 

178  (177,34),(177,130) 

179  (178,63) 

180 

181  (180,85),(180,113),(180,133) 

182  (181,138) 

183  (182,45),(182,71) 

184  (183,37),(183,54),(183,130)'(183'138),(183,155)'(183,166)'(183,174) 

185  (184,129) 

186 

187  (186,45)'(186,53)'(186,67)'(186,137),(186'145)'(186,153)' ( 186,155) 

188  (187,175) 

189  (188,53),(188,101),(188,173) 

190  (189,75),(189,108),(189,170) 

191  (190,189) 

192  (191,111) ,(191 ,150),(191 ,158) 

193 

194  (193,36),(193,76),(193,78),(193,115) ,(193,132) 

195  (194,65),(194,167) 

196  (195,34) ,(195,65),(195,135),(195,162),(195,177) 

197  (196,45) 

198  (197,63),(197,140),(197,171) 

199  (198,41),(198,145) 

200  (199,43)'(199,45)'(199,69)'(199,115) 

201  (200,57) 

202  (201 ,38)'(201 ,39)'(201 ,52)'(201'116)'(201 '124)'(201 '146)'(201'166) 

203  (202,63),(202,87),(202,201) 

204  (203,38),(203,126),(203,135) 
60 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
205  (204,185) 
206  (205,75),(205,138) 
207  (206,89),(206,161),(206,189) 
208 
209 
210  (209,59),(209,108),(209,123),(209,186),(209,194),(209,206) 
211  (210,35)'(210,45) ,(210,97),(210,99),(210,145),(21o,155),(210,165),(21 0,197),(210,209) 
212  (211 ,78) ,(211 ,121) ,(211 ,126) ,(211 ,201) ,(211 ,205) 
213 
214  (213,43),(213,70),(213,127),(213,190) 
215  (214,153),(214,211) 
216  (215,51),(215,122) 
217  (216,81) 
218  (217,124),(217,136) 
219  (218,173),(218,179) 
220  (219,41),(219,126),(219,181) 
221  (220,117) 
222  (221,35),(221,71) 
223  (222,65),(222,175),(222,211) 
224  (223,55),(223,139),(223,153) 
225 
226  (225,127),(225,168),(225,182) 
227  (226,33),(226,117),(226,135) 

228  (227,174),(227,185),(227,197),(227,210) 

229  (228,209) 

230  (229,55),(229,60),(229,111),(229,195),(229,220) 

231  (230,93) 

232  (231,82),(231,127) 

233  (232,57) 

234  (233,74),(233,143),(233,198) 

235  (234,41),(234,51),(234 ,83)'(234,85),(234,131),(234,195),(234,223) 

236 

237  (236,41),(236,165) 

238  (237,187) 

239  (238,123),(238,211),(238,219) 

240  (239,74),(239,147),(239,161),(239,230) 

241 

242  (241 ,90),(241 ,174) 

243  (242,105),(242,131),(242,141) 

244  (243,82),(243,90),(243,127),(243,209) ,(243,234) 

245 

246  (245,86),(245,131) ,(245,206),(245,239) 

247  (246,41),(246,193),(246,209) 

248  (247,129) ,(247,189) ,(247 ,226) ,(247,243) 

249 

250  (249,44) 

251  (250,93),(250,129) ,(250,159),(250,199) 

252  (251,65),(251,78) 

253 

254  (253,67),(253,99),(253,174),(253,199) 

255  (254,101) 
61 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
256  (255,41) ,(255,166),(255,227) ,(255,243) 
257 
258  (257,132) 
259  (258,179) 
260  (259,190) 
261  (260,69),(260,105) 
262  (261,34) ,(261 ,92) ,(261 ,126) ,(261 ,212) 
263  (262,33) ,(262,91) ,(262,151) ,(262,201) 
264  (263,158),(263,257) 
265 
266  (265,126),(265,156),(265,246) 
267  (266,65),(266,191),(266,221) 
268  (267,49),(267,87) ,(267,207),(267,239) 
269  (268,181),(268,225) 
270  (269,110),(269,246) 
271  (270,229),(270,253) 
272  (271,151),(271,177),(271,201 ),(271,267) 
273 
274  (273,55),(273,99),(273,130),(273,260) 
275  (274,103),(274,105),(274,123),(274,211) 
276  (275,134) 
277  (276,161),(276,177) 
278  (277,60),(277,67),(277,271),(277,276) 
279 
280  (279,34),(279,77) ,(279,79) ,(279,101)'(279,187)'(279,195) 
281 
282  (281,188),(281,207) 
283  (282,91),(282,121) 
284  (283,55),(283,142) 
285  (284,221) 
286  (285,78),(285,110) 
287 
288  (287,209),(287,279) 
289 
290  (289,198),(289,211) 
291  (290,189),(290,275) 
292  (291 ,54)'(291 ,94)'(291 '121),(291 ,225) ,(291 ,229) ,(291 ,246) 
293 
294  (293,62),(293,87),(293,179),(293,267) 
295  (294,65)'(294,81),(294,159)'(294'173)'(294,287)'(294 ,289) 
296  (295,126),(295,223),(295,241) 
297  (296,113) 
298  (297,103),(297,120),(297,252),(297,255) 
299  (298,165) 
300  (299,63),(299,167) 
301  (300,121),(300,149) ,(300,209),(300,261) 
302  (301,199),(301,268) 
303 
304  (303,97)'(303,153)'(303,163)'(303,275)'(303,287)'(303,294) 
305 
306  (305,104),(305,138) 62 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples {cont'd) 
307  {306,33),(306 ,51),(306,111),(306,119),(306,141),(306,221),(306,269),(306,285),(306,291) 
308  (307,181),(307,241) 
309 
310  (309,70),(309,76),(309,210) 
311  (310,99),(310,147),(310,273) 
312  (311 ,86),(311 ,122),(311,131),(311 ,207) 
313 
314  (313,114),(313,136),(313,180),(313,207),(313,232),(313,267)  ,(313,307) 
315  (314,251),(315,54) 
316  (315,114), (315,166),(315,173),(315 ,245) ,(315,262),(315,265),(315,282) 
317  (316,49) 
318  (317,116),(317,134) 
319  (318,71),(318,161) 
320  (319,103),(319,139),(319,255) ,(319,274) ,(319,283) 
321 
322  (321 ,46),(321,208),(321 ,290) 
323  (322,103),(322,163) 
324  (323,170),(323,270),(323,302) 
325  (324,153) 
326  (325,36) ,(325,51) ,(325,135),(325 ,306) 
327 
328  (327,65),(327,75),(327,93) 
329  (328,273) 
330  (329,78),(329,188),(329,215),(329,255) 
331  (330,85),(330,187),(330,217),(330,263) 
332  (331 ,222),(331,225),(331 ,229) 
333 
334  (333,86),(333,139),(333,163),(333,274),(333,278),(333,286) 
335  (334,55),(334 ,81),(334,231),(334,249),(334,259) 
336  (335,41),(335,114) 
337  (336,65),(336,81),(336,161) 
338  (337,40),(337,186),(337,216) 
339  (338,165) 
340  (339,95),(339,121) 
341  (340,153),(340,201) 
342  (341,236),(342,91) 
343 
344  (343,114),(343,115),(343,178),(343,322) 
345  (344,209) 
346  (345,40),(345,70),(345,102) 
347  (346,123),(346,141),(346,273) 
348  (347,182),(347,186),(347,230),(347,314) 
349 
350  (349,258) 
351  (350,45),(350,47) 
352  (351 ,66),(351 ,89) ,(351 ,179),(351 ,249),(351,325),(351 ,334),(351 ,347) 
353  (352,97) 
354  (353,158),(353,176),(353,326) 
355  (354,43),(354,53),(354,79),(354,165),(354,235),(354,239),(354,275),(354,353) 
356  (355,262) 
357 63 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
358  (357'124),(357,132),(357,134),(357,220)'(357,223)'(357,351) 
359  (358,69),(358,93) 
360  (359,317) 

361 

362  (361,120),(361,291) 

363  (362,305) 

364  (363,175),(363,247),(363,255),(363,343) 

365  (364,141),(364,213),(364,237) 

366  (365,60),(365,87),(365,222) 

367  (366,69),(366,331) 

368  (367,237),(367,253) ,(367,265},(367,322) 

369  (368,209) 

370  (369,51),(369,86),(369,326),(369,366) 

371  (370,343) 

372  (371,206),(371,210),(371 ,290),(371 ,362) 

373 

374  (373,148),(373,276) 

375  (374,153),(374,161) 

376  (375,34),(375,65),(375,229) 

377  (376,337),(376,361) 

378  (377,90),(377,339) 

379  (378,203),(378,301),(378,353),(378,359) 

380  (379,190) 

381  (380,45) 

382  (381,36),(381,86),(381,99) 

383  (382,43),(382,75),(382,171),(382,273) 

384  (383,155),(383,233),(383,270) 

385 

386  (385,247),(385,271) 

387  (386,101),(386,251),(386,311) 

388  (387,47)'(387,93),(387'197),(387,233),(387,322) 

389  (388,133),(388,289) 

390  (389,38),(389,47},(389,158) 

391  (390,121)'(390,135),(390,253)'(390,327),(390,353) 

392  (391,169),(391,309) 

393 

394  (393,268),(393,370) 

395 

396  (395,110),(395,159),(395,170),(395,290),(395,294) 

397  (396,101),(396,133) 

398  (397,195),(397,244) 

399  (398,125),(398,203),(398,213) 

400  (399,54),(399,55)'(399,193)'(399,329),(399,381) 

401 

402  (401 ,36),(401 '71),(401 ,276) ,(401 ,306),(401 ,324) 

403  (402,287) 

404  (403,58),(403,237) ,(403,274),(403,397) 

405  (404,233) 

406  (405,36),(405,204) 

407 

408  (407,149) ,(407,323),(407,342) 
64 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
409  (408,65) 
410  (409,408) 
411  (410,129) ,(410,149) ,(410,269) ,(410,297) 
412  (411,181),(411,349) 
413  (412,277) 
414  (413,404) 
415  (414,89),(414,105),(414,189),(414,197),(414,253),(414,327) 
416  (415,186),(415 ,249) ,(415,285) ,(415,355) 
417 
418  (417,136),(417,334),(417,390),(417,412) 

419 

420  (419,66),(419,306) 

421  (420,49),(420,77),(420,141),(420,297) 

422  (421,222),(421 ,307),(421 ,318),(421 ,414) 

423  (422,33),(422,101),(422,371) 

424  (423,114),(  423,234),(  423,354),(  423,415) 

425  (424,225) 

426  (425,278),(425,318),(  425,338),(  425,404),(425,410) 

427  (426,247) 

428  (427,82),(427,151) ,(427,309),(427,394) 

429  (428,113) 

430  (429,60),(429,207),(  429,308),(  429,350),(429,386) 

431  (430,69),(430,79),(430,117),(  430,141),(  430,307) 

432  (431,257),(431,342) 

433 

434  (433,280),(433,387),(433,414) 

435  (434,383),(434,413) 

436  (435,199),(435,201 ),(435,221),(  435,382),(  435,399) 

437  (436,265) 

438  (437,284) 

439  (438,71),(438,79) 

440  (439,189),(  439,363),(  439,385),(439,403),(439,438) 

441  (440,89),(440,393) 

442  (441,38),(441 ,255),(441,264),(441,358),(441 ,388) 

443  (442,163) 

444  (443,77),(443,402) 

445  (444,137) 

446  (445,55),(445,102),(445,180) 

447 

448  (447,51 ),(447,205),(447,213),(447,330),(447,349),(447,359) ,(447,367) 

449 

450  (449,60),(449,204) 

451  (450,137),(450,221) ,(450,259),(450,321) ,(450,329) ,(450,375) 

452  (451,205) ,(451 ,286) ,(451 ,369) 

453 

454  (453,166),(453,370) 

455  (454,295) 

456  (455,107),(455,147) ,(455,222) 

457  (456,353) 

458  (457,175),(457,204) 

459  (458,89),(458,453) 
65 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
460  (459,103),(459,153),(459,346) 
461  (460,109) 
462  ( 461 ,219),(461 ,338),(461 ,372) 
463  (462,61 ),(462,187),(462,295),(462,413) 
464  (463,75),(463,127),(  463,142),(  463,147),(  463,235) 
465 
466  (465,144),(465,259),(  465,386),(  465,436) 
467  (466,243) ,(466,351) ,(466,393) ,(466,411) 
468  (467,63),(467,74),(467,290),(467,422) 
469  (468,433) 
470  (469,139),(469,318) 
471  (470,305) 
472  (471,61 ),(471 ,130),(471 ,165),(471 ,227),(471 ,317) ,(471,421) 
473 
474  (473,98),(473,335) 
475  (474,157),(474,265),(474,369) 
476  (475,63),(475,129),(475,151),(475,471) 
477  (476,185) 
478  (477,330) 
479  (478,105),(478,163),(478,339),(478,441),(478,465) 
480  (479,183),(479,315) 
481  (480,385) 
482  (481,210),(481 ,252),(481 ,264) ,(481 ,312),(481,388) 

483  (482,221),(482,293),(482,365) 

484  (483,37),(483,78),(483,149) 

485  (484,237),(484,421) 

486  (485,419),(485,447),(485,470),(485,479) 

487  (486,163),(486,419),(486,443) 

488  (487,177),(487,205),(487,229),(487,249) ,(487,411) 

489 

490  (489,180),(489,316),(489,454) 

491  (490,303),(490,345),(490,375) 

492  (491,327),(491,377),(491,474) 

493  (492,133),(492,361) 

494  (493,132),(493,228),(493,295) 

495  (494,281) 

496  (495,133),(495,323),(495,419),(495,471) 

497  (496,129),(496,289) 

498  (497,35),(497,110),(497,366) ,(497,392) 

499 

500  (499,94),(499,346),(499,390) 

501 

502  (501 ,254),(501 ,418) ,(501 ,430) 

503 

505  (504,97) 

506  (505,108) ,(505,216),(505,244),(505,396) 

507  (506,47) ,(506'101)'(506,203) ' ( 506,237)'(506,263)'(506,345)'(506,413) 

508  (507,81),(507,90) 

509 

510  (509,179),(509,203),(509,227) ,(509,468) 
66 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
(510,287),(51 0,305),(510,367),(510,369) ,(510,433) 
(511,34),(511 ,87),(511 ,322) ,(511 ,334) 67 
Appendix B 

Table of Low-Weight Special Primes:  p = 2k + 2i - 1 

Field Size  {k,i) tuples 
64  {63,34),(63,46),(63,50),(63,56) 

65  {64,33},{64,60) 

66  (65,64) 

67  (66,36},(66,43),(66,46),(66,54),(66,59),(66,63) 

68  (67,48) 

69  (68,58),(68,60) 

71  (70,35),(70,42),(70,43),(70,48),(70,56),(70,59) 

72  (71,46},(71,48),(71,52),(71,54) 

73  (72,57) 

74 

75  (74,55),(74,66),(74,72) 

76  (75,36),(75,54),(75,62),(75,64) 

77  (76,47) 

78  (77,76) 

79  (78,38),(78,48),(78,62) 

80  (79,46),(79,72) 

81  (80,52),(80,63),(80,67),(80,73) 

82 

83  (82,34),(82,39),(82,54),(82,58) 

84  (83,58) 

85  (84,72),(84,78) 

86  (85,40},(85,52),(85,72) 

87  (86,42),(86,52),(86,54),(86,60) 

88  (87,56),(87,60) 

89  (88,37),(88,51),(88,53) 

90 

91  (90,43),(90,72),(90,82) 

92  (91,32},(91 ,38),(91 ,42),(91 ,58),(91 ,80) 

93  (92,54),(92,64),(92,66) ,(92,72) 

94  (93,40) 

95  (94,72) 

96  (95,82),(95,88),(95,94) 

97  (96,33),(96,53),(96,63),(96,71 ),(96,91) 

98 

99  (98,64),(98,88) 

100  (99,32),(99,40),(99,66),(99,76),(99,86) 
101  (100,62)'(100,76),(100,87)'(100,93) ,(100,94)'(100,96) 
102  (101,36) 68 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
103  (102,34) ,(102,52),(102,64) ,(102,76) ,(102,82) ,(102,87) ,(102,99) 
104 
105  (104,52) ,(104 ,75) ,(104 ,91) ,(104,103) 
106  (105,96) 
107  (106,63) 
108  (107,60),(107  ,90),(107  ,96),(107,102) 
109  (108,60),(108,98) 
110  (109,72) 
111  (110,48),(110,52)'(110,55),(110,67),(110,84),(110,99) 
112  (111 ,60),(111 '74),(111 ,106) 
113  (112 ,34),(112,60)'(112'71),(112,102)'(112'105),(112,109) 
114 
115  (114,32) 

116  (115,56),(115,66),(115,74),(115,84),(115,96) 

117  (116,36),(116,70),(116,85) 

118  (117,88) 

119  (118,51),(118,63),(118,99) 

120  (119,36),(119,40) 

121  (120,35)'(120,53)'(120,68),(120,69),(120,89),(120,92)'(120,108) 

122  (121,96) 

123  (122,64),(122,84) 

124  (123,36),(123,40),(123,66),(123,76) 

125  (124,40),(124,96),(124,98) 

126 

127  (126,40)'(126,50)'(126,51),(126,66)'(126,84),(126,116) 

128  (127,36),(127'78),(127,106),(127,110) 

129  (128,115),(128,124) 

130 

131  (130,58) ,(130,66),(130,68),(130,90)'(130,106),(130,119),(130,124) 

132  (131,106) 

133  (132,92) 

134  (133,64) 

135 

136  (135,34)'(135,42)'(135 ,46),(135,54),(135'76) 

137  (136,64),(136,122) 

138  (137,48) 

139  (138,55)'(138,60)'(138,104),(138'112) 

140  (139,86),(139,106) 

141  (140,55),(140,67) 

142  (141,52) 

143  (142,59),(142,67),(142,80),(142,95),(142,115) 

144 

145  (144,32)'(144,45)'(144 ,48) ,(144,50),(144,71),(144,76) ,(144,88),(144,98)'(144,103),(144,123)'(144,135),(144,143) 

146  (145,80) 

147  (146,115),(146,124) 

148  (147,48)'(147,68)'(147,82)'(147'126)'(147'136),(147'142) 

149  (148,59)'(148,69)'(148,70)'(148,109)'(148'132) 

150 

151  (150,36) ,(150,38) ,(150,128),(150,132) ,(150,148) 

152  (151 ,46) ,(151 ,62) ,(151 ,82),(151 ,96) 

153  (152,46),(152,106) ,(152,130) 
69 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
154 
155  (154,35),(154,100),(154,106)'(154,143)' ( 154,150) 
156  (155,36) ,(155 ,130) ,(155 ,138) ,(155,148) 
157  (156,39),(156,66)'(156,67)'(156,102)' ( 156,103),(156,112),(156,115)'(156'143),(156,144) 
158  (157,32},(157,96) ,(157,112) 
159  (158,108) 
160  (159,88),(159,110),(159,116)'(159,138) 
161  (160,110),(160,117) 
162 
163  (162,50)'(162'76),(162'108),(162'115),(162,135)'(162'159) 
164  (163,48),(163,120) 
165  (164,138),(164,151) 
166 
167  (166,42),(166,66)'(166,67)'(166,152) 
168  (167,108) 
169  (168,55),(168,91},(168,162) 
170  (169,120) 
171  (170,60),(170,90),(170,160) 
172  (171,72),(171,76),(171,98) 
173  (172,40),(172,42),(172,66),(172,95),(172,117),(172,124),(172,126) ,(172,165) 
174 
175  (174,32),(174,88),(174,102) ,(174,130),(174,135) 
176  (175,90},(175,126),(175,130) 

177  (176,70},(176,120) ,(176,147) 

178  (177,96) 

179  (178,71) ,(178,72},(178,87),(178,152),(178,163) 

180  (179,72) ,(179,100) ,(179,106) 

181  (180,46)'(180,82),(180,108),(180,142),(180,167),(180,174) 

182  (181,44),(181 ,128),(181 ,164) 

183  (182,39),(182,127),(182,160) 

184  (183,166) 

185  (184,130},(184,160) 

186  (185,40),(185,136) 

187  (186,34),(186,60)'(186,90) ,(186,115),(186,116)'(186,143)'(186,150),(186,159)'(186,163),(186,184) 

188  (187,36),(187,108),(187,110),(187,138) 

189  (188,82)'(188,103),(188,109)'(188,168) 

190  (189,168) 

191  (190,36),(190,63)'(190,75),(190,95)'(190,118),(190,140),(190,150)'(190,159) 

192  (191,84),(191,120) 

193  (192,41)'(192,65),(192,86)'(192,120)'(192'121)'(192,132)'(192'162)'(192,179)'(192,184) 

194 

195  (194,156) 

196  (195,32)'(195,50)'(195,56)'(195,122)'(195'190) 

197  (196,52),(196,60)'(196,82) ,(196,110)'(196'125)'(196,141)'(196,143) ,(196,186) 

198  (197,60},(197,172) 

199  (198,38),(198,124),(198,172),(198,192) 

200  (199,58)'(199,120)'(199,168)'(199,188),(199,190) 

201  (200,121) 

202 

203  (202,116),(202,130),(202,192) 

204 
70 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
205  (204,72) 
206 
207 
208  (207,86),(207,100),(207,150),(207,206) 
209  (208,78),(208,107) 
210 
211  (210,64),(210,139) ,(210,151),(210,204) 
212  (211,34),(211 ,36) ,(211 ,48),(211,70) ,(211 ,128),(211 ,150),(211 ,198) 
213  (212,99),(212,178) 
214  (213,48),(213,120),(213,208) 
215  (214,102),(214,103),(214,135),(214,142),(214,160),(214,196),(214,211) 
216  (215,184) 
217  (216,140),(216,156) 
218  (217,176),(217,216) 
219  (218,43),(218,78),(218,84),(218,162) 
220  (219,96),(219,156),(219,196) 
221  (220,39),(220,69),(220,80),(220,133),(220,173) 
222  (221,40),(221,208) 
223  (222,74),(222,108),(222,155),(222,195),(222,212) 
224  (223,80) 
225  (224,42),(224,73) 
226 
227  (226,66),(226,107),(226,111),(226,140),(226,192) 
228 
229  (228,70),(228,99),(228,108),(228,195),(228,211) 
230 
231  (230,199),(230,211) 
232  (231 ,40),(231 ,130),(231,180) 
233  (232,75),(232,99),(232,169) ,(232,170),(232,179) 
234 
235  (234,62) 
236  (235,74),(235,90),(235,120),(235,192) 
237  (236,51 ),(236,60),(236,120),(236,171),(236,199) 
238 
239  (238,78),(238,118),(238,179),(238,188),(238,192) 
240  (239,36),(239,192),(239,216) 
241  (240,58),(240,98),(240,101),(240,108),(240,111) ,(240,155),(240,157) ,(240,177),(240,201) 
242 
243  (242,180),(242,196),(242,219) 
244  (243,40),(243,100) 
245  (244,50),(244,171),(244,172),(244,186) 
246  (245,96) 
247  (246,34),(246,39),(246,79) ,(246,192),(246,200),(246,215),(246,231) 
248  (247,110),(247,206),(247,222) 
249  (248,132),(248,190),(248,228) 
250  (249,88) 
251  (250,35) ,(250,52),(250 ,63),(250,84),(250,91),(250,111),(250,152),(250,248) 
252  (251,70) 
253  (252,51 ),(252,61) ,(252,78) ,(252,168),(252,174),(252,210),(252,214) 
254  (253,56) ,(253,136),(253,168),(253,188) 
255  (254,66),(254,88),(254,232) 71 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
256  (255,96),(255,176),(255,232) 
257  (256,96),(256,106),(256,130),(256,166),(256,196) ,(256,203),(256,206),(256 ,225),(256,231),(256,252) 
258 
259  (258,32),(258 ,40),(258,58),(258,107),(258,128) ,(258,162),(258,192),(258,231),(258,242) 
260  (260,37),(260,112),(260,127),(260,139),(260,163),(260,190) 
261 
262  (261,84) 
263  (262,40),(262 ,99),(262,107),(262,162),(262,186),(262,190),(262,208) 
264  (263,156),(263,240) 
265  (264,88),(264,106),(264,140),(264,185),(264,203),(264,251) ,(264,255),(264,256) 
266  (265,232) 
267  (266,55),(266,100),(266,162),(266,172) 
268  (267,216) 
269  (268,32), (268,37), (268 ,64),(268,180) 
270 
271  (270,76),(270,138),(270,154),(270,206) 
272  (271 ,42),(271 ,48),(271 ,54),(271,140),(271,156),(271,174),(271 ,222),(271 ,230) ,(271 ,266) 
273  (272,52),(272,66),(272,88),(272,115),(272,126),(272,232),(272,270) 
274 
275  (274,36),(274,71),(274,95),(274,140),(274,176) 
276  (275,90),(275,234) 
277  (276,93),(276,117),(276,144),(276,202),(276,267),(276,274) 
278  (277,268) 
279 
280  (279,98),(279,126),(279,228) 
281  (280,62),(280,107),(280,108),(280,132),(280,255) 
282 
283  (282,39),(282,100),(282,104),(282,122),(282,182),(282,196),(282,198),(282,219),(282,235),(282,264),(282 ,270) 
284  (283,78),(283,104) 
285  (284,102),(284,136),(284,186),(284,211),(284,238) 
286  (285,192) 
287  (286,82),(286,274) 
288  (287,106),(287,136) ,(287,142) ,(287  ,208) 
289  (288,61),(288,119),(288,140),(288,142),(288,144),(288,208),(288,278) 
291  (290,252),(290,258) 
292  (291,144),(291,240),(291 ,262),(291 ,270) 
293  (292,37),(292,58),(292,220),(292,264) 
294 
295  (294,36),(294,91),(294,166),(294,231),(294,276) 
296  (295,96),(295,146),(295,180) 
297  (296,51),(296,126),(296,127),(296,130) 
298 
299  (298,55),(298,231),(298,232),(298,250) 
300  (299,172),(299,292) 
301  (300,93),(300,142),(300,148),(300,154),(300,221),(300,259) 
302  (301,48),(301,204) 
303  (302,160),(302,244) 
304 
305  (304,138) 
306 72 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
307  (306,100),(306,139),(306,194),(306,246),(306,275),(306,294) 
308  (307,86),(307,182),(307,262),(307,306) 
309  (308,139),(308,192),(308 ,240),(308,253),(308,294) 
310  (309,40),(309,76) 
311  (310,59) ,(310,90),(310,108) ,(310,135),(31 0,136),(310,162),(310,186),(310,255) ,(310,294),(310,304) 
312  (311,36),(311,130),(311,262) 
313  (312,51),(312,62),(312,64) ,(312,86),(312,108),(312,121),(312,165),(312,175),(312,188),(312 ,230) ,(312,290), 
(312,309) 
314  (313,48),(313,208) 
315  (314,208) 
316  (315,176),(315,306) 
317  (316,61),(316,74),(316,114),(316,132),(316,135),(316,176),(316,285) 
318  (317,100),(317,136),(317,276) 
319  (318,90),(318,95),(318,103),(318,167),(318,190),(318,290),(318 ,295),(318,302) 
320  (319,56),(319,178) 
321  (320,36),(320,159),(320,190),(320,196),(320,232),(320,286),(320,306) 
323  (322,36),(322,195) 
324  (323,60),(323,184),(323,258) 
325  (324,46),(324,70),(324,151),(324,198),(324,202) 
326  (325,104),(325,144),(325,184),(325,224),(325,324) 
327  (326,67),(326,90),(326,91),(326,99),(326,216),(326,270),(326,312) 
328  (327,42) ,(327,98),(327,106),(327,140),(327,168) ,(327,246) 
329  (328,109),(328,121),(328,133),(328,159),(328,232),(328,238),(328,317) 
330  (329,160) 
331  (330,48),(330,78) ,(330,123),(330,130),(330,160),(330,255) ,(330,278) 
332  (331,116) 
333  (332,70),(332,91),(332,324) 
334  (333,60) 
335  (334,51),(334,60),(334,75) ,(334,156),(334 ,238),(334,250),(334,315) 
336  (335,330) 
337  (336,81),(336,283),(336,290) 
338  (337,48) 
339  (338,150),(338,294) 
340  (339,100),(339,120),(339,128),(339,302) 
341  (340,45),(340,50),(340,71) ,(340,72) ,(340,238) ,(340,243)  ,(340,300) 
342  (341 ,48),(341 ,64),(341,100),(341 ,196),(341,244),(341 ,280),(341 ,312) 
343  (342,72),(342,116) ,(342,256),(342,287) 
344  (343,58),(343,78),(343,114),(343,308) 
345  (344,120),(344,195),(344,265),(344,283) 
346 
347  (346,91),(346,102),(346,104) ,(346,142),(346,147),(346,203),(346,327),(346,343) 
348  (347,160) 
349  (348,40),(348,80),(348,134),(348,141),(348,168),(348,190),(348,207),(348,229) 
350 
351  (350,60),(350,124) 
352  (351,144),(351,172) 
353  (352,44),(352,89),(352,165),(352,305),(352,328) 
354 
355  (354,36),(354,156),(354,162),(354,312) 
356  (355,32) ,(355,38),(355,60),(355,134),(355,178),(355,260) 73 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
357  (356,114),(356,126),(356,163},(356,184) 
358  (357,132) 
359  (358,68) ,(358,172) ,(358,202},(358,320),(358,323) 
360  (359,78) ,(359,202) 
361  (360,71)'(360,179)'(360,181),(360,206) ,(360,248)'(360,267),(360,280)'(360,291),(360,315)'(360,356) 
362  (361 ,64},(361 ,224),(361,312) 
363  (362,100},(362,151 ),(362,207},(362,294) 
364  (363,36) ,(363,46),(363,58),(363,74)'(363,94)'(363 ,248)'(363,250)'(363,274) 
365  (364,85},(364,142) 

366  (365,64)'(365 ,220)'(365,264),(365,316),(365,336)'(365,360) 

367  (366,170),(366,207},(366,232) ,(366,252) 

368  (367,128) 

369  (368,78) 

370 

371  (370,224) 

372  (371,64),(371,84) 

373  (372,58),(372,84)'(372'111),(372'192)'(372,231),(372,334),(372,351)'(372,359) 

374  (373,160},(373,344) 

375  (374,36),(374,72) '(374,102)'(374,132)'(374,195)'(374,228) 

376  (375 ,100) ,(375,204)'(375 ,212) ,(375 ,252)'(375,264)'(375,368) 

377  (376,174),(376,232},(376,240),(376,313) 

378 

379  (378,140),(378,258),(378,354) 

380  (379,48),(379,302),(379,366) 

381  (380,234) 

382 

383  (382,64) ,(382,180) '(382,300)'(382,348)'(382 ,376) 

384 

385  (384,33},(384,301},(384,341),(384,343) 

386 

387  (386,124),(386,150) 

388  (387,XXX),(387,262),(387,382) 

389  (388,63},(388,109},(388,123),(388,150),(388,267) 

390  (389,60) 

391  (390,83),(390,128),(390,230)'(390,306)'(390,331) ,(390,334)'(390,338) 

392  (391 ,122),(391 ,128) ,(391 ,326) 

393  (392 ,58) ,(392'75) ,(392,135) ,(392 ,256) ,(392 ,306) ,(392 ,348) ,(392 ,391) 

394 

395  (394,343) 

396  (395,36},(395,96),(395,262),(395,336),(395,376) 

397  (396,44)'(396,75)'(396,107)'(396,167),(396,202) ,(396,205)'(396,243),(396,370),(396 ,386) 

398  (397,272) 

399  (398,54),(398,147) '(398,180),(398,187),(398,219) 

400  (399,130),(399,292},(399,362) 

401  (400,123),(400,136),(400,312),(  400,330),(  400,389) 

402  (402,98),(402,252) ,(402,299),(  402,312),(  402,366) 

403 

404  (403,108),(403,114),(403,216),(403,240) 

405  (404,115),(404,171),(404,351),(404,363) 

406 

407  (406,102),(406,104) ,(406,116),(406,210),(406,232),(406,240) ,(406,262),(406,312),(406,316),(406,344),(406,370) 
74 
Field Size 
408 
409 
410 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 
425 
426 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
433 
434 
435 
436 
437 
438 
439 
440 
441 
442 
443 
444 
445 
446 
447 
448 
449 
450 
451 
452 
453 
454 
455 
456 
{k,i) tuples {cont'd) 
(407,238) 

(408,94),(408,99) ,(408,103),(408,121 ),(408,131),(408,140),(408,175) ,(408,207) ,(408,214),(  408,233),(  408,255), 

(408,307),(408,313) ,(408 ,357) 

(409,56),(409,240) 

(411,140)(411 ,162),(411,222),(411 ,232) ,(411 ,292) 

(413,220) 

(414,90),(414,278),(  414,298),(  414,371),(414,402) 

(415,84),(415 ,118),(415 ,224),(415 ,346) 

(416,66),(416,73),(416,279),(416,295),(416,330),(416,396) 

(418,102),(418,130),(418,138),(418,142),(418,211),(418,238),(418,291),(418,330),(418,415) 

(420,50),(  420,98),(  420,114),(420,115),(420,126),(  420,173),(  420,215) ,(420,248) ,(420,256),(  420,326),(  420,327), 

(420,379),(  420,388),(  420,389) 

{421,116),(421,184),(421 ,260),(421 ,288) 

(422,162),(422,240),(  422,258),(  422,420) 

(423,46),(423,240),(423,394) 

(424,63),(424,112),(424,221),(424,363),(424,375) 

(426,162),(  426,187),(  426,252),(  426,415) 

(427,222),(427,302),(427,390) 

(428,150),(428,222),(428,234) 

(429,396) 

(430,78),(430,79),(430,207),(430,214),(  430,286),(  430,295) 

(431,370) 

(432,82),(432,111),(  432,226),(  432,232),(432,249),(  432,260),(  432,275),(432,344),(432,420),(432,424) 

(434,355) 

(435,206),(435,226),(435,288),(435,294),(435,312) 

(436,35),(436,40),(436,147),(436,299),(436,349),(436,354),(436,384) 

(437,172),(437,376) 

(438,40),(438,47),(438,107),(438,322),(438,350),(438,362),(438,388) 

(439,62),(439,162),(  439,216),(  439,258) 

(440,37),(440,217),(440,240) 

(441,336) 

(442,95),(442,104),(  442,150),(  442,154),(442,166),(  442,367),(  442,388) 

(443,40),(  443,94),(  443,330),(443,348) 

(444,75),(444,398) 

(445,392),(445,396) 

(446,55),(446,280) 

(448,289),(448,298),(448,323),(448,351),(448,382),(448,410),(448,433) 

(450,218),(450,244),(450,326),(450,330),(450,431) 

(451 ,34),(451 ,168) ,(451 ,230) 

(452,114),(452,192) ,(452,199),(  452,391),(  452,445) 

(4~3,208),(453,324) 
(454,382),(454,388) 

(455,84),(455 ,126) ,(455 ,292) ,(455,342) ,(455 ,418) ,(455 ,444) 
75 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
457  (456,42),(456,83) ,(456,87),(456,240),(456,252),(  456,327),(  456,341) ,(456,376) 
458  (457,128) 
459  (458,75),(458,151) 
460  (459,66),(459,138),(  459,222),(  459,260),(459,458) 
461  (460,95)'(460,108),(460,256),(460,306) ,(460,352)'(460,432),(460,436) 
462  (461 ,280) 
463  (462,140),(462,320),(  462,327),(  462,355),(  462,415) 
464  (463,116),(463,150),(463,164),(463,366) 
465  (464,343),(464,460) 
466 

467  (466,34),(466,51),(466,246),(466,259),(466,271),(  466,440),(  466,444) 

468  (467,202),(467,462) 

469  (468,122),(468,318) 

470 

471  (470,84),(470,103),(470,108) 

472  (471 ,84),(471 ,242),(471,250),(471 ,438),(471,470) 

473  (472,34),(472,144),(  472,212),(  472,317),(472,381),(  472,431),(  472,469) 

474 

475  (474,38),(474,186),(  474,258),(  474,266),(474,291) 

476  (475,80),(  475,82),(  475,102),(475,192) 

477  ( 4 76 ,139) ,(476,183) ,(476,222) ,(  4 76,250) ,(476,270) ,(476,373),(476,454) 

478 

479  (478,58),(  478,68),(  478,120),(  478,163),(  478,210),(  478,387) 

480 

481  (480,92),(480,122),(480,211),(480,274),(480,318) ,(480,371),(480,407),(480,463) 

482 

483  (482,99),(482,172),(482,387) 

484  (483,128),(483,156),(483,158) 

485  (484,35),(484,156),(484,243),(  484,276),(  484,315),(  484,352),(  484,406),(484,431) 

486  (485,180),(485,204) 

487  (486,54),(486,103),(  486,132),(  486,135),(486,139),(  486,163),(  486,204),(  486,311),(  486,371 ),(486,384),(486,403), 
(486,462),(486,467) 
488  (487,108),(487,146),(487,468),(487,476) 
489  (488,52),(  488,61),(  488,120),(  488,133),(  488,163),(488,172),(488,207),(488,277),(488,358),(488,367) 

490 

491  (490,112),(490,131),(490,143),(490,239),(490,255),(490,311),(490,323),(490,332),(490,412) 

492  (491,36),(491,52),(491,274),(491,376) 

493  (492,108),(492,211),(492,261) 

494 

495  (494,420) 

496  (495,42) ' ( 495,78)'(495'132),(495 ,222),(495,308),(495,408),(495 ,428) 

497  (496,95),(496,131),(496,147),(496,170),(496,172),(496,206),(  496,220),(  496,360),(  496,457) 

498 

499  (498,87),(498,159),(498,238),(498,319),(498,462) 

500  (499,70),(499,266) 

501  (500,36) ,(500,42)'(500,60) ,(500,63),(500,157),(500,267),(500,342),(500,375) ' ( 500,378),(500,411)'(500,447) 

502  (501,172),(501,268) 

503  (502,44)'(502,100),(502'139),(502,164),(502,394),(502,426)'(502,431) ' ( 502,475) 

504  (503,448) 

505  (504,88),(504,90),(504'112), (504,213),(504,375) ' ( 504,382),(504,396),(504,410)'(504,495) 
76 
Field Size  (k,i) tuples (cont'd) 
506  (505,40},(505,312),(505,424) 

507 

508  (507,168},(507,208},(507,226),(507,258) 

509  (508,39),(508,64},(508,350),(508,364),(508,503) 

510  (509,280) 

511  (510,67),(510,79),(510,115) ,(510,183),(51 0,259),(510,323),(510,408),(510,499) 

512  (511,102),(511 ,156),(511 ,344),(511 ,462},(511 ,466) 
